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EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED:                                         
A CORPUS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF EXECUTIVE 
POWER☨ 
Eleanor Miller & Heather Obelgoner* 
 
“Nothing Since my return to America, has alarmed me so much, as 
those habits of Fraud, in the use of Language which appear in 
conversation and in public writings. Words are employed like paper 
money, to cheat the widow and the fatherless and every honest 
Man.”—John Adams1 
                                                                                                             
☨ Where we quote directly from Founding Era documents, the spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and 
typeface (where practicable) have been maintained from the original. It should be noted that 
eighteenth-century writers and publishers generally did not abide by any universal standards in spelling, 
punctuation, capitalization, and typeface. In the preface to his dictionary, Samuel Johnson lamented that, 
when he set about the task of compiling entries for his dictionary, he found contemporary speech to be 
“copious without order, and energetick without rules . . . there was perplexity to be disentangled, and 
confusion to be regulated; choice was to be made out of boundless variety, without any established 
principle of selection.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 7 (London 1785). 
A guide to English grammar published at the end of the eighteenth century explained that 
Punctuation is the art of marking in writing the several pauses, or rests, between 
sentences, and the parts of sentences. . . . So the doctrine of punctuation must needs be 
very imperfect: few precise rules can be given which will hold without exception in all 
cases; but much must be left to the judgment and taste of the writer.  
ROBERT LOWTH, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR 114–15 (Philadelphia, R. Aitken 
1799). For a significantly more comprehensive elucidation on Founding Era punctuation conventions, see 
Michael Nardella, Knowing When to Stop: Is the Punctuation of the Constitution Based on Sound or 
Sense?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 667 (2007). 
* Eleanor Miller, J.D. 2018, and Heather Obelgoner, J.D. 2018, are graduates of Georgia State University 
College of Law. Eleanor is an attorney at the Department of Treasury in Washington, D.C., and Heather 
is a law clerk to the Honorable Robert Benham of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The opinions (and any 
mistakes) in this Article are solely ours; they are not reflective of, nor should they be ascribed to, our 
employers. Finally, we extend our sincere gratitude to Clark Cunningham for his instrumental guidance 
and support during the research and authoring of this paper. We also thank Edward Finegan and Julian 
Mortenson, who kindly contributed their valuable time and invaluable expertise during the drafting of this 
paper. The research reported in this article was presented at a Workshop on Law & Linguistics, hosted by 
Georgia State University, Friday, October 18, 2019. PowerPoints and video from the Georgia State 
presentation, including comments by Julian Mortenson and Edward Finegan, are available 
at: http://www.clarkcunningham.org/Workshop-Law-Linguistics.html. 
 1. Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Lincoln (June 19, 1789), in The Adams Papers, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0629 [https://perma.cc/B63U-
VLQ6]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Article II allows me to do whatever I want,” President Donald 
Trump claimed, without even a whiff of irony.2 And though even the 
most fledgling of armchair constitutional scholars will recognize that 
this statement does not comport with the reality of our Constitution or 
system of governance, exactly what is meant by Article II’s vestment 
of the “executive power” in the President is a different matter. Though 
this question may have received more attention as of late, it certainly 
is not novel. Within a year of the Constitution’s ratification, John 
Adams opined that “Executive Power is uncertain.”3 And indeed, of 
the three branches of the American government, the limits and scope 
of the executive branch have proven to be the most elusive to scholars 
and jurists alike. President Barack Obama’s enlistment of the 
executive order to implement policies that Congress declined to pass 
led Congressional Republicans to label him “a dictator who abused his 
power and disregarded the Constitution.”4 More recently, President 
Trump has claimed that he, as President, has a “complete power to 
pardon,” setting off yet another firestorm of questions surrounding the 
extent of executive power.5 
And the question remains: what really is executive power? One 
answer lies in the original meaning of the phrase itself. Importantly, 
original meaning is not the same as original intent. Put more eloquently 
                                                                                                             
 2. Jason Lemon, Trump Insists the Constitution’s Article II ‘Allows Me to Do Whatever I Want,’ 
NEWSWEEK (June 16, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-insists-constitution-allows-do-
whatever-want-1444235 [https://perma.cc/6N5F-FZTR]. 
 3. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the United States Senate (July 15, 1789), in 3 THE ADAMS 
PAPERS: DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 217, 220 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-03-02-0008-0001 [https://perma.cc/C6KQ-HNVN]. 
 4. Carl Hulse, Trump Follows Obama’s Lead in Flexing Executive Muscle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/politics/donald-trump-barack-obama-executive-
orders.html [https://perma.cc/C5YT-TH6U]. During the Obama presidency, House Speaker Paul Ryan 
remarked, “We have an increasingly lawless presidency where [Obama] is actually doing the job of 
Congress, writing new policies and laws without going through Congress.” Id. 
 5. Doug Stanglin, In 2-hour Tweetstorm, Trump Claims a President’s ‘Complete Power to Pardon,’ 
USA TODAY (July 22, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/22/2-
hour-tweetstorm-trump-claims-presidents-complete-power-pardon/501887001/ [https://perma.cc/KE4D-
3D6H]. 
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by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, “[i]t is the law that governs, not the 
intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only 
the laws that they enact which bind us.”6 Whereas the original intent 
inquiry focuses on the Framers’ expectations and desires, original 
meaning concerns itself with the “common meaning of the enacted 
text.”7 This relatively new form of originalist thinking, dubbed “public 
meaning originalism,” acknowledges the inherent difficulty (and 
arguable futility) in attempting to ascertain the Framers’ intentions and 
instead focuses on analyzing the “communicative content” or 
linguistic meaning of constitutional text.8 In the past, scholars have 
been forced to rely heavily on Founding Era dictionaries and legal texts 
when analyzing the public meaning of a constitutional phrase.9 Despite 
its appeal, this method has been the subject of significant criticism 
because neither dictionaries nor legal texts accurately reflect 
generalized public meaning.10 However, modern linguistic tools, such 
as large-scale electronic databases comprised of searchable texts 
known as corpora, provide a unique opportunity for updated originalist 
interpretations.11 
This paper will engage linguistic and historical analysis in an effort 
to discern the original public meaning of the phrase executive power 
as used in Article II of the United States Constitution. In light of 
                                                                                                             
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997). 
 7. Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (2007). 
 8. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 268 
(2019); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 275 (2017) (“The key idea 
is that the participants in the complex process of [constitutional] authorship intended to make the 
communicative content of the constitutional text accessible to the public at the time the text went through 
the ratification process.”). 
 9. Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 284. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 291; see also CORPUS LINGUISTICS: READINGS IN A WIDENING DISCIPLINE 1 (Geoffrey 
Sampson & Diana McCarthy eds., 2005) (defining “corpus” as “a collection of specimens of a language 
as used in real life, in speech or writing, selected as a sizeable ‘fair sample’ of the language as a whole or 
of some linguistic genre, and hence as a useful source of evidence for research on the language”). This 
paper primarily relies on the beta version of Brigham Young University’s Corpus of Founding Era 
American English (COFEA). The first of its kind, the COFEA combines a wide variety of Founding Era 
texts of all genres and contains approximately 150 million searchable words from over 118 thousand texts 
dating from 1750 to 1800. Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 294; Corpus of Founding Era American English 
(COFEA), BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lcl.byu.edu/projects/cofea/ 
[https://perma.cc/WB8L-TZNJ] (last visited Nov. 23, 2019) [hereinafter COFEA]. 
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significant modern controversy surrounding the proper limits of 
executive authority, an original meaning interpretation of this critical 
phrase will illuminate the executive’s function as it was commonly 
understood at the time of constitutional ratification. Part I will engage 
in a linguistic analysis of the phrase executive power, drawing 
primarily on corpus linguistic methodology surrounding the phrase’s 
Founding Era usage. Part II will analyze the history of Article II, with 
particular attention to the public discourse concerning the scope and 
reach of the British king’s powers. Part III will fuse these areas of 
analysis and propose a synthesized original meaning of the phrase 
executive power. And, finally, Part IV will consider the Supreme Court 
cases of Myers v. United States and Steel Seizure,12 seminal cases of 
executive power jurisprudence, as well as the public discourse 
surrounding those cases at the time of their being decided. 
I.   Linguistic Analysis 
Corpus linguistics provides an empirical framework for original 
meaning analysis. Namely, the extensive word-based data collections 
allow researchers to track trends in word usage during the Founding 
Era and beyond. By reviewing lines of text from both sophisticated 
legal documents and more general writings from the era, researchers 
can potentially gain insight into the original meaning of a word by 
tracking the frequency and contextual usages most commonly 
associated with historical words and phrases across all genres of text. 
This feature is particularly important in light of “linguistic drift,” the 
idea that the meaning of a word shifts subtly over time, fundamentally 
altering the way that the word or phrase is perceived by one generation 
as compared to another.13 Importantly, linguistic drift may be 
responsible for disparities between the original meaning of a 
constitutional phrase and the way that the phrase has been interpreted 
by courts and scholars in modern times. 
                                                                                                             
 12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 13. Solum, supra note 8, at 279 (“When a word or phrase is used in its conventional sense, the relevant 
patterns of usage are those of the linguistic community to which the author belongs at the time the text is 
written.”). 
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The following corpus linguistic research is premised on the 
hypothesis that the word executive has experienced linguistic drift 
since the 1700s, coloring the modern understanding of executive 
power as it pertains to the President and creating an ambiguity in the 
term. Tables 1 and 2 below are illustrative of the shift: 
 
      Table 1        Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above tables map collocates of the word executive—words that 
frequently co-occur with the word executive.14 Table 1 provides a list 
of words that immediately precede the word executive in Founding Era 
                                                                                                             
 14. The choice was made to limit the search to the collocates one to the left of executive in order to 
pull modifying adjectives. 
 
5
Miller and Obelgoner: Effective but Limited: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the Origin
Published by Reading Room,
612 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue 
texts,15 whereas Table 2 tracks the same for modern usage.16 The only 
word that appears in both lists—chief—is highlighted in grey. 
Although a very simple comparison, potential linguistic drift is 
immediately apparent from the data. In Table 1, executive’s collocates 
largely bear governmental connotations, for example: supreme, 
independent, national, and federal. However, the COCA data appear 
to be dominated by a private sphere connotation, with collocates such 
as senior, marketing, advertising, and corporate. Moreover, a search 
of chief executive officer in the COFEA yields only seven results, all 
of which refer to the leader of a governmental body.17 On the other 
hand, the same phrase in the COCA returns 2,050 results, with the vast 
majority of hits referencing leaders of private businesses.18 In fact, in 
a random sample of 100 COCA hits, 96% referenced leaders of 
business entities.19 
This linguistic dichotomy suggests that the modern understanding 
of executive power as it pertains to presidential power is perhaps 
colored by a usage of the term executive that is exclusive to the modern 
age—an understanding that is exemplified by the popular campaign 
catchphrase suggesting that the President should “run the government 
like a business.”20 In fact, a corpus-based analysis using Google’s book 
scanning tool21 shows that the first recorded use of the phrase 
“government like a business” appears in the 1920s, with the phrase 
                                                                                                             
 15. Table 1 presents data from the COFEA. 
 16. Table 2 presents data from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), which 
contains approximately 560 million words from spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and 
academic texts from 1990–2017. Corpus of Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, 
https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4P-XNYY] (last visited Nov. 23, 2019) 
[hereinafter COCA]. 
 17. COFEA, supra note 11 (search “chief executive officer”). 
 18. COCA, supra note 16 (search “chief executive officer”). 
 19. Id. (filter for random sample of 100). 
 20. See Philip Bump, Trump’s Idea to Run the Government Like a Business Is an Old One in American 
Politics, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2017, 1:42 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/03/27/trumps-idea-to-run-the-government-
like-a-business-is-an-old-one-in-american-politics/?utm_term=.1b4a3feff9fc [https://perma.cc/WA2X-
JME7] (tracking the use of the phrase “government like a business” between 1800 and the present). 
 21. The Google Book Ngram Viewer searches a corpus of books over user-selected years. Ngram 
Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams/info [https://perma.cc/ZNV8-3D87] (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2019). 
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gaining popularity under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.22 
Despite modern political rhetoric’s conflating these two distinct 
understandings, or senses, of executive, the original public meaning of 
executive power was likely something quite different. And although 
the thrust of this paper is not an outright comparison of the modern 
framing of executive power with its Founding Era understanding, this 
shift in meaning is nevertheless relevant to demonstrating why an 
empirical original meaning analysis of executive power is necessary to 
fully understand the scope of Article II. To that end, the following 
presents data on the frequency and usage of the phrase executive power 
during the Founding Era as supporting evidence of the phrase’s 
original public meaning. 
A. Linguistic Methodology 
As a preliminary matter, and as is evidenced by the previous 
discussion, executive power is a polysemous phrase; thus, any 
meaningful analysis of its usage must recognize and distinguish its 
various meanings.23 Corpus linguists differentiate the senses 
associated with polysemous words and phrases through a process 
called coding.24 During the coding process, a word or phrase is 
searched in an electronic database known as a corpus.25 The corpus 
search produces key word in context (KWIC) concordance lines 
showing snapshots of text containing the searched phrase, thereby 
allowing the linguistic researcher to glean the sense of the phrase from 
the words around it.26 This method is based on the idea that the 
meaning of a word or phrase is dependent on the context in which it is 
used—similar to the noscitur a sociis rule of statutory construction in 
law.27 Based on review of the KWIC concordance lines, different 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. 
 23. Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 285. Polysemy occurs when a word is attributed with more than 
one sense or meaning. Id. 
 24. Id. at 293. 
 25. Id. at 292–93. 
 26. Id. at 293. 
 27. Id.; see also Noscitur a Sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A canon of 
construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase, esp. one in a list, should be determined 
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senses are assigned numbers and search results are categorized 
according to which sense they implicate. 
Here, the senses of the phrase executive power were coded pursuant 
to grounded theory methodology—instead of predetermining set 
categories of senses and conforming the data to those categories, the 
senses used in this analysis were coded based on the prevailing 
meanings that emerged during the data review itself.28 Because of the 
amorphous nature of the phrase, and in order to record the most 
nuanced results possible while at the same time avoiding confirmation 
bias, grounded theory’s more flexible methods were preferable to 
rigidly preset categories based on either dictionary definitions or 
researcher expectations.29 In particular, permitting the addition of 
sense codes proved instrumental in pinpointing the introduction of new 
applications and uses of executive power and matching those 
developments to historical events. 
B.  “Executive Power” Frequency Data 
The COFEA results for executive power were coded according to 
the following six sense categories based on usage patterns that 
emerged through ongoing KWIC concordance line review: 
(1) As belonging to a single elected governmental leader 
(such as a governor or a president);30 
(2) As belonging to the head of a private company;31 
                                                                                                             
by the words immediately surrounding it.”). 
 28. See James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing 
Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design 
and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1611 (2017). Consistent with accepted methodology, and as a 
means of quality assurance, where a new category was created, the previous results were reviewed anew 
to ensure that they did not fit better within the newly created sense code. 
 29. Id. (comparing methods of linguistic sense coding). 
 30. THOMAS REESE, AN ESSAY ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION IN CIVIL SOCIETY 20 (Charleston, 
Markland & M’Iver 1788) (“The chief magistrate, who is invested with the supreme executive power, is 
bound by oath, faithfully and impartially to execute the laws, and govern agreeably to them.”). 
 31. Although this connotation did not emerge as a prevailing sense in the COFEA data, it was 
nevertheless included as a possibility in light of the modern usage of the term and the notion of linguistic 
drift discussed supra Part I. 
 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/9
2020] EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED 615 
(3) As referring to one’s autonomy over oneself (akin to 
willpower);32 
(4) As belonging to a body of governmental leaders (such as 
a council or a legislature);33 
(5) As belonging to a king or a hereditary leader;34 
(6) As a division of finite governmental power relating to the 
allocation of responsibilities between governmental 
branches.35 
In addition to sense and frequency, the register, or type of source, and 
year were also recorded for comparison. 
The following chart depicts the normalized frequency results across 
registers of the above-described sense coding between 1755 and 1789 
by date in five-year increments.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 32. See, e.g., MOSES HEMMENWAY, SEVEN SERMONS, ON THE OBLIGATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT 
OF THE UNREGENERATE, TO LABOUR FOR THE MEAT WHICH ENDURETH TO EVERLASTING LIFE 19 
(Boston, Kneeland & Adams 1767) (“For in this respect, there is no essential difference, between the 
unregenerate and the regenerate. The same faculties of understanding and will, and executive power, 
physically considered, belong to both. No one I think can or will pretend, that these duties are beyond the 
natural ability of a sinner, provided he has a disposition or will to observe them.”). 
 33. See, e.g., JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE CONDUCT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY: MORE PARTICULARLY, IN THE LAST SESSION OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 48 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1762) (referring to the executive power of the “Governor 
and Council,” “However, if this was the only instance that ever had happened of such an exertion of the 
executive power by the Governor and Council, it seems to be very applicable to the right of originating 
taxes . . . .”). 
 34. See, e.g., JOSEPH GALLOWAY, A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THE MUTUAL CLAIMS OF 
GREAT-BRITAIN, AND THE COLONIES: WITH A PLAN OF ACCOMMODATION ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 15 (New York, G. Wilkie & R. Faulder 1780) (1775) (“The King is that representative; and 
as such is vested with the executive power of the British government.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 599, 599 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (“That greatest and most necessary of all 
Amendments, the Seperation of the Executive Power, from the Legislative seems to be better understood 
than it once was.”). 
 36. A corresponding table displaying the raw results of this review is attached as Appendix 1. 
Additionally, Appendix 2 displays frequency per million in chart form. 
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Figure 1 
 
Consistently, sense (1) experienced a relatively high rate of usage 
as compared to other senses. However, the data show three notable 
exceptions. First, between 1760 and 1764, sense (4), referring to a 
body of governmental leaders, dominated the usage of executive 
power. This usage spike is especially stark when compared to the sense 
(4) usage frequency in other time periods, which was often among the 
lowest out of the six senses recorded. Second, between 1770 and 1774, 
sense (5), referring to the executive power of a king, likewise saw a 
spike in usage frequency as compared to other senses during that 
timeframe. And between 1785 and 1789, sense (6), referring to the 
division and allocation of a finite amount of governmental power, 
emerged as a new, discrete sense and was used slightly more 
frequently than sense (1). Finally, the absence of any sense (2) use in 
Founding Era text is noteworthy, further supporting the notion that 
executive power has experienced linguistic drift in the modern age. 
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A review of historical events and circumstances helps explain the 
statistical anomalies noted above.37 The high frequency usage of sense 
(4), occurring in the first part of the 1760s, is possibly attributable to 
the structure of many colonial governments. For example, 
Massachusetts’s colonial government was comprised of a governor 
and an executive council, which were jointly endowed with the 
executive power.38 Prior to the formation of the Articles of 
Confederation, and subsequently, the Constitution itself, there appears 
to have been little discussion of a joint colonial executive power; 
rather, reference to executive power apart from the British king was 
largely defined by each colony’s governmental structure—some of 
which were characterized by executive councils, instead of singular 
governors. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that many 
of the early-1760s sources in which executive power appeared were 
election sermons and political speeches geared toward the politics of 
particular colonies, instead of more sophisticated commentaries on the 
formation of the American union.39 
Progressing chronologically, the spike in the early 1770s of sense 
(5) use, referring to the executive power of the king, correlates to the 
beginnings of mounting political unrest in the American colonies 
aimed at Great Britain. Following the Boston Tea Party in 1773 and 
the passage of the Intolerable Acts, the colonists convened the First 
Continental Congress in 1774, during which they petitioned King 
George III for relief from the oppressive acts of Parliament.40 Thus, 
colonial leaders during this time purported loyalty to the king while at 
the same time denouncing the acts and authority of the British 
Parliament.41 Accordingly, it follows that the usage frequency of 
                                                                                                             
 37. The following historical references are meant merely to provide context for the empirical linguistic 
data. For an in-depth discussion of the significance of these historical events as they relate to the original 
public meaning of “executive power,” see infra Part II. 
 38. See JAMES OTIS, supra note 33, at 43 (‘“This was an act which the Governor with the Council had 
a right to do’ . . . . ‘It was a legal and constitutional exercise of the powers vested in them.’ ‘It was an 
exertion of the executive power.’”). 
 39. See app. 1. 
 40. Nathan S. Chapman et al., Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1700–02 
(2012). 
 41. As an aside, historical debate surrounds whether the rhetoric of “loyalty to the Crown” was merely 
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executive power referring to the king’s authority to address colonial 
concerns would increase as a result of these historical events. 
Finally, sense (6) is not seen until the latter half of the final decade 
surveyed, with the first recorded use in 1785. The emergence of the 
sixth sense, referring to the allocation of finite governmental power, 
signifies a shift in the discussion of executive power and the balance 
of powers more generally. Whereas the earlier usages focused largely 
on the established connotations of executive power as it manifested in 
a scheme of government—that is, who wielded the power—by the late 
1780s, the conversation was more focused on the proper scope of the 
power—that is, what is executive power and how far does it reach. It 
is unsurprising then, that this more philosophical use of executive 
power coincides with the drafting of the Constitution, the beginning of 
the ratification debates, and the rise of the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists. 
C.  The Semantics of Article II 
In addition to the empirical data derived from corpus linguistic 
studies, linguistic semantics can also provide insight into the original 
public meaning of constitutional phrases.42 Although linguists espouse 
different semantic theories, semantic analysis for the purpose of 
determining original meaning in the legal context requires a fact-based 
inquiry into the “sentence meaning” of the constitutional text.43 
                                                                                                             
lip service espoused by colonial leaders in an attempt to manipulate the common people when what the 
colonial leaders really desired was total independence. See Neil L. York, The First Continental Congress 
and the Problem of American Rights, 122 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 353, 353 (1998) (referencing 
colonial leader Joseph Galloway’s assertion that “[t]he men who had dominated Congress and pushed 
through the Declaration of Rights were duping the people and manipulating public opinion”). 
Nevertheless, a focus on the secret, private meaning underlying open, public speech is the job of 
original-intent originalists. To reach the original public meaning, the words must be taken as they would 
have been understood by their public audience, even if that audience were being manipulated. 
 42. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 28–29 (Univ. of Ill. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 07-24, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 
[https://perma.cc/3PTA-RJRH]. Because the authenticity of constitutional typography and syntax is 
largely uncontroverted, this paper assumes that the portions of the Constitution discussed infra are free 
from scrivener’s errors and accurately reflect the original constitutional text. See id. 
 43. Id. at 36–37 (“Meanings in the semantic sense are facts determined by the evidence. They are not 
courses of action adopted on the basis of normative concerns.”). 
 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/9
2020] EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED 619 
Whereas scholars of original-intent originalism are concerned with the 
speaker’s meaning—that is, what the Framers wanted by using the 
phrase executive power—the sentence meaning is the primary concern 
of scholars focused on public meaning—that is, what the Framers 
actually said according to the ordinary rules of grammar and 
construction when they chose to write Article II in the way that they 
did.44 By focusing on objective clues, such as sentence structure and 
word choice, the resulting linguistic analysis is further removed from 
normative considerations and, therefore, is arguably more indicative 
of original public meaning. 
Notably, the first sections of Articles I, II, and III provide for the 
vesting of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers 
respectively.45 However, the structure of each of these sections is 
decidedly different. For example, only Article I qualifies the scope of 
the power it vests, stating, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”46 The limiting language 
“herein granted” implies that Congress is restricted to exercising only 
those legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution. Article II on 
the other hand merely notes that “[t]he executive Power shall be 
vested” without any similarly restrictive language.47 In fact, Article 
II’s Section One is the only of the three not to include qualifying 
language, as Article III provides for “[t]he judicial Power of the United 
States.”48  
Furthermore, the use of the singular form of power in Article II is 
significant.49 First, the singular form suggests that executive power is 
viewed as a collective unit, as opposed to the fragmented or divisible 
sense of legislative power present in Article I.50 And, secondly, the 
                                                                                                             
 44. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 120 (1989); see also Solum, supra note 42, at 
35 (defining “sentence meaning” as “the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that 
constitute the utterance”). 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1. 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 49. See Julian D. Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2019). 
 50. The concept of a singular, natural executive power is reminiscent of early uses of “executive 
power” to refer to the hereditary power of the King. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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singular form in the context of the sentence implies that the entirety of 
the executive power is vested in the President, again standing in stark 
contrast to the apportioned grant of legislative power in Article I. 
Indeed, these purposeful distinctions are highlighted in some of the 
earliest Federalist interpretations of the constitutional scope of the 
executive power. In John Adams’s 1789 notes from a congressional 
discussion of the President’s removal powers, he noted, “There is an 
explicit grant of Power to the President . . . . The Executive Power is 
granted—not the Executive Powers hereinafter enumerated and 
explained.”51 Similarly, in his 1791 Pacificus essays, Alexander 
Hamilton cited the syntactical composition of Article II in defense of 
his argument for an expansive executive power, relying heavily on 
“[t]he different mode of expression employed in the constitution in 
regard to the [legislative and the executive powers].”52 This early 
attention to syntactic and typographical interpretation by the Founders 
themselves further supports the importance of semantic linguistic 
analysis in deciphering constitutional meaning. 
                                                                                                             
 51. Adams, supra note 3, at 218 (discussing the scope of the President’s removal power). 
 52. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-15-
02-0038 [https://perma.cc/TBE4-87HJ]. Relevantly, Hamilton explains: 
It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to consider this enumeration 
of particular authorities as derogating from the more comprehensive grant contained in 
the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or 
qualifications. . . . The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in 
regard to the two powers the Legislative and the Executive serves to confirm this 
inference. In the article which grants the legislative powers of the Governt. the 
expressions are—”All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the UStates;” in that which grants the Executive Power the expressions are, as 
already quoted “The Executive Po⟨wer⟩ shall be vested in a President of the UStates of 
America.” . . . The enumeration ought rather therefore to be considered as intended by 
way of greater caution, to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in the 
definition of Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that 
power, interpreted in conformity to other parts ⟨of⟩ the constitution and to the principles 
of free government. The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the Executive 
Power of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to 
the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the instrument. 
Id. Hamilton’s essays were published in newspapers and, thus, were widely available to the public. Patrick 
J. Garrity, The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS (Sept. 23, 2013), 
https://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-pacificus-helvidius-debates/ [https://perma.cc/E8NK-
3RWW]. 
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Interestingly, however, the strict textual reading of Article II 
avowed by the Federalists in support of their arguments for an 
expansive executive vested in a singular President seems somewhat at 
odds with the corpus linguistic data previously discussed—in 
particular the high frequency usage of sense (4) referring to a shared 
executive power.53 Accordingly, although the syntax of the final 
version of Article II’s grant of executive power does facially suggest a 
general grant of power “subject only to the exceptions and 
qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the [Constitution],”54 the 
frequency data suggest that the public’s understanding of the executive 
power may not have been limited to such a discrete and 
compartmentalized allocation.55 Indeed, the New Jersey Plan 
presented at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 referred to an 
elected “federal Executive to consist of [some number of] persons” and 
consistently refers to a plural number of executives.56 And even the 
competing Virginia Plan, which advocated a single executive, 
nevertheless suggested a shared executive power. For example, the 
Virginia Plan outlined an executive council of sorts that would 
function as a check on the legislature, proposing that “the Executive 
and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose 
a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the 
National Legislature before it shall operate.”57 
Moreover, as noted above, sense (4) usage often aligned with 
references to colonial governmental structures.58 Similarly, parallels to 
these governments were drawn by political leaders at the 
Constitutional Convention, suggesting that colonial executive 
structures influenced the way in which the Framers understood the 
power of the executive. For example, James Madison recorded in his 
account of the Constitutional Convention debates a commentary on 
                                                                                                             
 53. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 54. Hamilton, supra note 52. 
 55. See OTIS, supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 56. Madison Debates: June 15, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ 
debates_615.asp#9 [https://perma.cc/JRD3-W4LV] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 57. Madison Debates: May 29, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ 
debates_529.asp#rand [https://perma.cc/KXV9-MVNA] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 58. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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Federalist delegate James Wilson’s advocacy for a single executive 
power, noting the fact that colonial governments often shared 
executive power between a chief magistrate and a council: 
[I]n each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of 
the Govt. It was so [Mr. Wilson] admitted, and properly so, 
and he wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Govt. 
But then it should be also remarked that in all the States there 
was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate 
could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the 
establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the 
King has a Council; and though he appoints it himself, its 
advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence 
of the people.59 
In addition to the governmental structures of the colonies, many 
other iterations of shared executive power were proposed and debated 
at the Convention.60 And interestingly, early versions of Article II 
contemplating a single executive were often characterized by 
extremely limited language, more similar to the final version of Article 
I. Importantly, the final draft of Article II that was produced by the 
Constitutional Convention and presented to the Committee of Detail 
provided: 
                                                                                                             
 59. Madison Debates: June 4, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_604.asp [https://perma.cc/HBF5-2JN5] (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019). It is of further note that the chief magistrate in these colonial governments lacked 
significant executive authority and, accordingly, was essentially powerless outside of the authority granted 
to him by the colony’s legislature. Letter from Joseph Reed to George Washington (May 17, 1781), in 
The Washington Papers, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-
01-02-05811 [https://perma.cc/3ZA7-AEKZ] (stating that the legislature’s refusal to authorize the 
colonial executive’s emergency power left the executive in a “state of imbecility” and “without 
powers . . . to answer the publick expectations”). 
 60. E.g., Madison Debates: June 6, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_606.asp [https://perma.cc/P6WN-F8BB] (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019) (proposing that the executive power be shared “with a convenient number of the National 
Judiciary”). 
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That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single 
person, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term 
of seven years, to be ineligible a second time, with power to 
carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices 
in cases not otherwise provided for, to be removable on 
impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of 
duty, to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his 
time to the public service, to be paid out of the national 
treasury.61 
Here, the structure of the proposal provides for a “national 
executive . . . with power to [perform certain tasks],” standing in stark 
contrast to the final version of Article II which vests “the executive 
power” as a single, all-encompassing unit in the President. Thus, early 
versions of Article II point out a subtle linguistic tension between the 
meaning and usage of the word power—that is, power meaning the 
duty to complete specific acts versus power as a grant of discretionary 
authority. And although the latter meaning is seemingly memorialized 
in the final text of Article II, the robust debate surrounding the 
allocation of executive power and the draft produced by the 
Convention at large calls into question whether, as a matter of public 
meaning, the plain text of Article II created by the Committee of Detail 
aligns with the way the phrase was understood in Founding Era 
discourse.62 
                                                                                                             
 61. WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787: 
AN EFFORT TO TRACE THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EACH SEPARATE CLAUSE FROM ITS FIRST 
SUGGESTION IN THAT BODY TO THE FORM FINALLY APPROVED 197–98 (1900). Other early versions of 
provisions reminiscent of Article II contained similarly limited language. See, e.g., Madison Debates: 
June 13, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_613.asp 
[https://perma.cc/R68D-QBGH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019); Madison Debates: June 18, AVALON 
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_618.asp [https://perma.cc/XC5D-DKGW] 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (stating “[t]he authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows”); 
Madison Debates: June 19, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_619.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9APP-U4BP] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
 62. This conclusion is further bolstered by evidence that the final language of Article II is the product 
of committees, which were heavily influenced by three key Federalists and not larger Convention-wide 
debate. Morton J. Frisch, Executive Power and Republican Government–1787, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 281, 282 (1987). Scholars have pointed to this evidence as a means to argue that the seemingly broad 
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II.   Historical Analysis 
The corpus linguistic data discussed above demonstrates that the 
meaning of the phrase executive power evolved somewhat in the 
decades before the drafting of the Constitution. The shifting senses of 
the phrase, as mentioned above, correlate with events and 
circumstances in the Founding Era, the outcomes of which influenced 
future meanings of the phrase. Thus, without an understanding of the 
historical backdrop against which these meanings evolved, the 
empirical data alone is meaningless. 
So, it stands to reason that, in attempting to define the phrase, courts 
and scholars alike generally cannot, and arguably should not, dispense 
with an analysis of colonial American history leading up to the 
American Revolution. These analyses often focus on the colonists’ 
supposed rebellion against King George III and the Framers’ 
subsequent attempts to rein in the power of the executive branch to 
prevent the rise of a king-like executive.63 However, some historians 
contend that the colonists rebelled not against the Crown but against 
Parliament.64 And of course, convincing evidence exists to support 
both positions; indeed, it appears that even the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention disagreed as to the impetus for the colonial 
rebellion.65 The following analysis proceeds on the theory that neither 
view was ascribed to universally—that some colonists believed they 
                                                                                                             
language of the vesting clause was a deliberate attempt by Federalist drafters to sneak in broad language 
that could later be used to justify an expansive executive authority. See, e.g., Thomas S. Langston & 
Michael E. Lind, John Locke and the Limits of Presidential Prerogative, 24 POLITY 49, 53–54 (1991). 
 63. Interestingly, some decisions argue the exact opposite—that the Framers had no intention of 
weakening the power of the executive. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698–99 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“The major ‘fortification’ provided [to the executive branch], of course, was the veto 
power. But in addition to providing fortification, the Founders conspicuously and very consciously 
declined to sap the Executive’s strength in the same way they had weakened the Legislature: by dividing 
the executive power.”). 
 64. See, e.g., ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION 2 (2014). Nelson posits that “[t]he American 
Revolution, unlike the two seventeenth-century English revolutions and the French Revolution, was—for 
a great many of its protagonists—a revolution against a legislature, not against a king. It was, indeed, a 
rebellion in favor of royal power.” Id. 
 65. See id. at 1. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, in response to the proposal to vest the executive power 
in one person, remarked that the Americans, “having just rebelled against the British Crown, had ‘no 
motive to be governed by the British Government as our prototype.’” Id. James Wilson of Pennsylvania 
responded that “[t]he people of America did not oppose the British King but the parliament—the 
opposition was not against an Unity but a corrupt multitude.” Id. 
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were rebelling against the king, while others believed they were 
rebelling against Parliament—and argues that the original meaning of 
executive power must be informed not only by the more immediate 
events leading up to the American Revolution, but also by 
contemporary political theory and events in British history that shaped 
early Americans’ understanding of the phrase. To that end, it is helpful 
to briefly consider the relevant theory and events in order to 
contextualize Founding Era discussions of executive power. 
A.   Executive Power in Theory and in Practice 
The Framers and colonial Americans as a whole were certainly 
familiar with and influenced by the political theorists of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though the works of three such 
theorists—John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau—figure more prominently in the discussion of executive 
power than others.66 A more thorough discussion of their writings can 
be found elsewhere; here, we simply wish to introduce the basic 
principles of these theorists, focusing on their treatment of the 
executive power and recurrent themes present in the works that later 
surfaced in the American discourse. 
1.   John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 
First published in 1689, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 
begins with the proposition that all men are subject to the laws of 
nature, but within the confines of those laws, men are free to act as 
they see fit and to do with their property as they wish.67 However, 
                                                                                                             
 66. It is worth noting that the works of William Blackstone were also influential. Indeed, Sir Edmund 
Burke of the House of Commons, a leading proponent of the colonists’ cause in Parliament, commented 
on the ubiquity of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Common Law in the American colonies, asserting 
that as many copies of the treatise were sold in the colonies as in England. ERIC STOCKDALE & RANDY J. 
HOLLAND, MIDDLE TEMPLE LAWYERS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 15 (2007). However, 
Blackstone was greatly influenced by the works of Montesquieu—so much so that scholars have 
commented that Blackstone’s “plagiarism ‘would be nauseating if it were not comic.’” M. J. C. VILE, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 112 (1967). Thus, we have elected not to include 
in this article a separate analysis of Blackstone’s influence on the colonists. 
 67. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 122 (Thomas L. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 
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natural law prohibits any man from harming the life, health, liberty, or 
possessions of any other man.68 In the natural state, man has two 
powers: the power to do whatever is necessary for the preservation of 
self and of others and the power to punish crimes committed in 
violation of natural law.69 Locke describes this power to punish as the 
means by which the execution of the law of nature is accomplished.70 
To move from the state of nature into civil society, individuals must 
relinquish a portion of that power possessed in the natural state; the 
first power, “he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society,” 
and the second he relinquishes in its entirety to “the executive power 
of the society.”71 For Locke, laws governing a society cannot be 
enacted without the consent of that society; the legislative power is 
derived from the people, who must grant that power voluntarily.72 The 
legislature is created by “the first and fundamental . . . law” of any 
society and has only so much power as the members of that society 
have conveyed to it.73 And to ensure that the laws enacted by the 
legislature have teeth, “there should be a power always in being which 
should see to the execution of the laws that are made and remain in 
force.”74 Locke emphasizes that the legislative and executive powers 
must be separate in order to prevent those who enact the laws from 
exempting themselves “from obedience to the laws they make, and 
suit[ing] the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private 
advantage.”75 
                                                                                                             
1947) (1689). 
 68. Id. at 123. 
 69. Id. at 185. 
 70. Id. at 124. 
 71. Id. at 185–86. 
 72. Id. at 188, 193. “[T]he legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains 
still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find the legislative act 
contrary to the trust reposed in them . . . .” LOCKE, supra note 67, at 196. 
 73. Id. at 188–89 (“[F]or [the legislative] being but the joint power of every member of the society 
given up to that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state 
of nature before they entered into society and gave up to the community.”). 
 74. Id. at 195. 
 75. Id. at 194. 
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Thus begins Locke’s earnest analysis of the executive power.76 At 
its core, the executive power is simply the power to execute the laws.77 
Ultimately, Locke posits that the executive’s primary aims are to 
protect the people’s property and to promote the public good. Indeed, 
when the people turn over their natural executive power to their 
government, a contract is created, by which the executive agrees to 
further these goals.78 Where the executive neglects these aims or 
otherwise acts contrary to his agreement with the people, then the 
executive has forfeited his authority, and the executive power reverts 
to the people.79 
2.   Baron de Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws 
Building on Locke, Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Laws, writes 
that all men are subject to the laws of nature, although Montesquieu 
holds that man in his natural state feels nothing but impotence, 
weakness, and fear.80 Men lose this weakness and fear upon entering 
society, which cannot exist absent some form of government.81 And 
again, like Locke, Montesquieu identifies two categories of power 
present in every government: legislative power and executive power.82 
He subdivides executive power into executive power over foreign 
affairs and executive power to execute laws.83 The first type of 
executive power, that over foreign affairs, encompasses the powers to 
make peace and war, send and receive ambassadors, establish the 
                                                                                                             
 76. Locke notes that a third power, which he terms the federative power, exists in every government. 
This power “contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all 
persons and communities without the commonwealth.” Id. at 195. According to Locke, the federative 
power and the executive power are almost always united; to place the powers in the hands of two distinct 
persons or bodies runs the risk that those two persons might act separately, resulting in “disorder and 
ruin.” Id. at 196. 
 77. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 195. 
 78. Id. at 246. 
 79. Id. at 246–47. 
 80. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS 
OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU 1, 5–6 (London, T. Evans 1777). 
 81. Id. at 6–7. 
 82. Id. at 16. 
 83. Id. at 198. 
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public security, and protect the society against invasion.84 
Montesquieu further subdivides the latter type of executive power into 
the power to execute the laws—termed the executive power of the 
state—which is employed to punish crimes, and the judiciary power, 
which is used to resolve disputes between individuals.85 While 
Montesquieu emphasizes the necessity of the separation of these 
powers to protect against arbitrary action on the part of any one of the 
three powers,86 he also proffers that the executive should have, in the 
form of the legislative veto, the power to stop any encroachments made 
by the legislature.87 Interestingly, this power does not cut both ways: 
Montesquieu posits that “as the execution has its natural limits, it is 
useless to confine it.”88 Instead, the legislature has some authority to 
direct the power of the executive and a right to assess the means by 
which the executive is executing the laws.89 He identifies potential 
danger “[i]f the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of 
a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good 
behaviour,”90 thereby implying that, while the executive has the 
discretion to imprison citizens as it sees fit, the legislature has the right 
to curb that discretion.91 Montesquieu also identifies several specific 
                                                                                                             
 84. This power is analogous to Locke’s federative power. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 85. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 80, at 198. 
 86. As Montesquieu explains: 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same 
body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest 
the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated 
from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life 
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would 
be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with violence and oppression. 
Id. at 199. 
 87. Id. at 209. In Montesquieu’s view, this power is necessary to ensure the preservation of the 
executive’s prerogative. Id. However, because the executive should have no share in the legislative power 
other than the power to veto, Montesquieu notes that the executive should exclude itself from public 
debates and should not propose legislation. Id. at 210. 
 88. Id. at 206. 
 89. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 80, at 207. Although the legislature has the power to examine the way 
in which the executive executes the laws, it has no power to judge the person of the executive himself. Id. 
 90. Id. at 201. 
 91. Id. Montesquieu also holds that the legislature can authorize the executive to imprison persons 
suspected of conspiring against the state. Id. at 201–02. 
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powers, which serve as checks on the other branches, reserved to the 
executive.92 
3.   Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract 
Finally, in his Social Contract, Rousseau expresses the view that 
citizens of a society comprise the sovereign power of the society and 
that people exercise a “general will” to direct the state to further the 
“common good.”93 As part of this sovereign power, the people have 
entered into a social contract, the aim of which is to “defend and 
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each 
associate.”94 This sovereignty, secured by the social contract, is both 
inalienable and indivisible.95 But unlike Locke and Montesquieu, 
Rousseau rejects the idea of the separation of powers96—the sovereign, 
again, is indivisible—but he accepts the fact that the functions of the 
government are, in fact, distinguishable.97 These functions are the 
executive power and the legislative power.98 
In Rousseau’s view, the legislative power is supreme;99 it constitutes 
the general will of the people, and only from this general will can the 
law radiate.100 The executive power, on the other hand, “is only the 
                                                                                                             
 92. These powers include the executive’s prerogative to regulate the assemblage of the legislature and 
to command the society’s army. Id. at 207, 211. According to Montesquieu, the legislature should not be 
assembled indefinitely. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 80, at 207, 211. Such a circumstance, he posits, would 
deprive the executive of much of its work and leave it with too little to do, resulting in an executive 
obsessed with consolidating and defending its power. Id. at 210. 
 93. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 22 (G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd. & E.P. Dutton & Co. 1913) (1762). 
 94. Id. at 14. Blackstone alluded to the idea of a contract between the executive and the society over 
which it presides, explaining that, in exchange for the executive’s protecting the community, every 
individual in that community owes a duty and allegiance. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*236. 
 95. ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 18–19. 
 96. Id. at 17. 
 97. VILE, supra note 66, at 115. 
 98. ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 23. 
 99. Id. at 78. “The legislative power is the heart of the State; the executive power is its brain, which 
causes the movement of all the parts.” Id. Rousseau goes on to note that, while a person can survive 
without his brain, once his heart ceases to function, the person dies. Similarly, a government can survive 
with a “paralyzed” brain, i.e., an incapacitated executive, but, without its heart—the legislature—the 
government is doomed. Id. 
 100. Id. (“The Sovereign, having no force other than the legislative power, acts only by means of the 
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force that is applied to give the law effect.”101 Government, then, is 
“the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and [the] prince or 
magistrate the man or the body entrusted with that administration.”102 
Like Montesquieu, Rousseau is emphatic in his belief that the 
executive should have no part in the functions of the legislature.103 
These three works share common threads that exerted significant 
influence on Americans, both before and after the Revolutionary War. 
First and foremost was the idea that executive power, at its most 
fundamental, is the power to execute the laws. Americans’ 
understanding of executive power fused various concepts drawn from 
these philosophers—most prominently, an aversion to the application 
of arbitrary power and an acknowledgment of a social contract—
shaped and refined by recent events, both in the colonies and at home 
in Britain. In the eyes of the colonists, the king, in whom the executive 
power vested, was the father of his people and the guardian of their 
rights and liberties.104 The king derived his power from a contract with 
                                                                                                             
laws . . . .”). 
 101. Id. at 84. This language appears numerous times in the ratification debates. 
 102. ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 50. 
 103. Id. at 36–37. In this regard, Rousseau echoes those concerns expressed by Montesquieu: 
[F]or if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, 
he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men; or else his 
laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate 
his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work. 
. . . . 
He, therefore, who draws up the laws has, or should have, no right of legislation, 
and the people cannot, even if it wishes, deprive itself of this incommunicable right, 
because, according to the fundamental compact, only the general will can bind the 
individuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity with 
the general will, until it has been put to the free vote of the people. 
Id. 
 104. Perhaps drawing from Locke’s idea that fathers exert authority over their children by the vestiges 
of “that executive power of the law of nature which every free man naturally hath,” the American colonists 
often analogized the king to a father. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 157. As the father of his people, the king 
had a duty to respect the rights and liberties of his people, but, because he wore the crown, his duty 
extended beyond merely respecting those rights—he was required to defend them. This duty flowed from 
the king’s compact with his people, as evidenced by his coronation oath. See JOHN ALLEN ET AL., THE 
AMERICAN ALARM, OR THE BOSTONIAN PLEA, FOR THE RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES, OF THE PEOPLE 6 
(Boston, D. Kneeland & N. Davis 1773) (“[T]he prosperity of the people intirely depends upon . . . the 
King’s preserving inviolable firm (according to his coronation oath) the laws, rights and previledges of 
the subjects . . . .”); John Hancock, Oration Delivered at Boston (Mar. 5, 1774), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS 
OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 12, 13 (H. Niles ed., Baltimore, William Ogden Niles 1822) (“[T]hose 
 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/9
2020] EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED 631 
the people in which he promised to preserve their laws, rights, and 
privileges.105 When the king wielded this power in an arbitrary 
manner, that is, however he so pleased,106 the contract between the 
king and his people was destroyed—the king no longer held the 
executive power.107 
4.   A (Brief) History of Monarchical Overreach 
Kings Charles I, James II, and, later, George III shared an 
experience that makes them unique among British monarchs—a forced 
relinquishment of power (or at least some of that power).108 The crux 
of the charges levied against both Charles and James boiled down to 
essentially identical accusations—misuse of the executive power and 
the royal prerogatives109 in violation of their contracts with their 
people—which later served as the framework upon which the 
Declaration of Independence was based. 
In 1626, Charles I invoked his royal prerogative to dissolve 
Parliament and, seeking funding for a potential war with Spain, to 
unilaterally levy subsidies against his people “in the guise of a forced 
                                                                                                             
rights and liberties which, as a father, [King George III] ought ever to regard, and as a king, he is bound, 
in honor, to defend from violations, even at the risk of his own life.”); MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S 
APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD (1775), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 1, 452 (Ellis Sandoz ed., Liberty Fund 2d ed. 1998) (“[T]he king’s coronation 
oath, whereby he swears to protect his subjects in all their just rights, to abjure popery, and maintain the 
protestant religion, to govern the kingdom and administer justice according to the laws of the realm.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 105. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 157–58. 
 106. Locke defines the exercise of arbitrary power as “governing without settled standing laws.” Id. at 
190. 
 107. See, e.g., Samuel Sherwood, Scriptural Instructions to Civil Rulers (1774), in POLITICAL SERMONS 
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra note 104, at 383. 
Subjects have rights, privileges and properties; and are countenanced and supported by 
the law of nature, the laws of society, and the law of God; in demanding full protection 
in the enjoyment of these rights, and the impartial distribution of justice, from their 
rulers. And when rulers refuse these, and will not comply with such a reasonable and 
equitable demand from the subject; the society is dissolved; and its fundamental laws 
violated and broken; and the relation between the ruler and the subject ceases, with all 
the duties and obligations that arose from it. 
Id. 
 108. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 274, 280, 283 (2009). 
 109. Id. at 280. 
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loan.”110 Those who refused to comply were imprisoned.111 After a 
brief reinstatement in 1628, Charles again, pursuant to his prerogative 
power, dissolved Parliament.112 When Parliament was recalled in 
1640, Charles found himself on the receiving end of significant 
outrage, culminating in his being accused of treason, tried, found 
guilty, and subsequently executed.113 The court’s sentence read as a 
laundry list of Charles’s crimes, which he committed ostensibly for 
“the advancement and upholding of the personal interest of will, 
power, and pretended prerogative to himself and his family, against 
the public interest, common right, liberty, justice, and peace of the 
people.”114 Most of the specific crimes of which Charles was found 
guilty related to his waging war against his own subjects, resulting in 
the deaths of thousands and the wastage of both public and private 
monies.115 The sentence though focused in large part on Charles’s 
abridgement of his people’s rights and liberties, as well as his 
concurrent failure to protect those rights and liberties in violation of 
his contract with the people. 
Following the eleven-year interlude during which the 
Commonwealth of England was both established and dissolved, the 
                                                                                                             
 110. Nicholas Tyacke, The Puritan Paradigm of English Politics, 1558–1642, 53 HIST. J. 527, 543 
(2010). 
 111. Kenneth Shipps, The “Political Puritan,” 45 CHURCH HIST. 196, 201 (1976). This episode resulted 
in a seminal case in British legal history, the Five Knights Case, so named for the five knights imprisoned 
on Charles’s orders for refusal to submit to the forced loan. The knights petitioned the Court of King’s 
Bench for writs of habeas corpus to secure release from their confinement, which had been accomplished 
“per speciale mandatum Domini Regis,” or by special command of the king. Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 
Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1 (K.B.) 9. Appearing on behalf of the king, the Attorney General argued that the 
monarch possessed an unlimited power to imprison people as he saw fit and that “it [was] part of the 
king’s prerogative that he can do no wrong.” Id. at 44. 
 112. Charles offered an explanation for the dissolution but prefaced this explanation with the 
now-familiar sentiment that “princes are not bound to give account of their actions, but to God alone.” 
The King’s Declaration Showing the Causes of the Late Dissolution (Mar. 10, 1621), in THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625–1660, 83, 83 (Samuel Rawson 
Gardiner ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1889). 
 113. The Death Warrant of Charles I (Jan. 29, 1648), in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 394, 394 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., Macmillan Co. 
1901). 
 114. Sentence of the High Court of Justice upon Charles I (Jan. 27, 1648), in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF 
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 113, at 392. 
 115. Id. at 393. 
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Stuart monarchy was restored to the throne.116 This short-lived 
restoration saw Charles II, son of Charles I, ascend to the throne, 
followed by his brother James II, who ruled for only three years before 
his abdication.117 But in those three years, James’s abuse of the royal 
prerogatives aroused the disdain of his subjects, specifically in regard 
to his efforts to reestablish his chosen faith—Roman Catholicism—in 
Britain.118 In furtherance of that goal, James exercised his prerogative 
to suspend all penal laws concerning ecclesiastical matters and to 
pardon his subjects for crimes committed in violation of those penal 
laws.119 Shortly thereafter, James, unlike his father, vacated his throne 
rather than wait for Parliament to remove him, although his voluntary 
abdication did nothing to dissuade Parliament from publicly airing its 
grievances against the former king.120 Upon the ascension of James’s 
successors, William and Mary of Orange, Parliament passed the 
English Bill of Rights, which, before asserting the rights and liberties 
of the British citizens, laid out those offenses of which James was 
purportedly guilty.121 These offenses included dispensing with and 
suspending of laws without parliamentary consent, invoking his 
prerogative to levy money for his own use contrary to the express 
direction of Parliament, raising and keeping a standing army and 
quartering soldiers without parliamentary consent, inflicting “illegal 
and cruel punishments,” and imposing excessive fines, all in support 
                                                                                                             
 116. Henry G. Roseveare, Charles II, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-II-king-of-Great-Britain-and-Ireland 
[https://perma.cc/VW4A-PHJZ]. 
 117. John P. Kenyon, James II, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-II-king-of-England-Scotland-and-Ireland 
[https://perma.cc/K2KG-4HYN]. 
 118. See STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 178 (2009). 
 119. 6 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1388–89 (London, T.C. Hansard 1806). 
 120. 5 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 64 (London, T.C. Hansard 1809). 
 121. The Bill of Rights (Dec. 16, 1689), in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY, supra note 114, at 463. In an earlier resolution, the House of Commons declared that James 
“endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom, by breaking the original Contract between king 
and people, and, by the advice of Jesuits, and other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental 
Laws, and having withdrawn himself out of this Kingdom, has abdicated the Government . . .” COBBETT, 
supra note 120. 
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of an effort “to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the 
laws and liberties of this kingdom.”122 
B.   Executive Power as Understood by Founding Era Americans 
As explained in Part I, beginning in 1762, the phrase executive 
power appeared with much greater frequency, albeit with fluctuations, 
in Founding Era publications.123 Corresponding with greater intrusions 
upon their rights and liberties by the British government, and with the 
seventeenth-century abuses of power by the monarchy undergirding 
the discussion,124 the colonists became more concerned with theories 
of government and personal liberty. As indicated by the corpus 
linguistic data, discussion of executive power remained confined to a 
relatively narrow sense of the phrase—as belonging to a single 
governmental leader—until about 1760. The data show that, around 
that time, the sense of the phrase expanded to include reference to a 
body of governmental leaders, and as discussed in Part I, this new 
sense likely resulted from increased attention to the power wielded by 
those bodies. 
According to John Adams, the year 1761 marked the 
commencement of the long struggle for American independence, with 
Boston attorney James Otis firing the (figurative) first shot. The 
impetus for this mutiny: the exercise of power in a clearly arbitrary 
manner by the Crown’s colonial representatives. Otis was solicited to 
represent a number of Boston merchants in regard to their objection to 
the issuance of a writ of assistance to a customs agent.125 In the eyes 
                                                                                                             
 122. The Bill of Rights, supra note 114. 
 123. See supra Figure 1. 
 124. Ellis Sandoz, Foreword to 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 
supra note 104, at xi, xxi. Colonial American discourse was riddled with cautionary reference to Kings 
Charles I and James II. Id. For instance, January 30 was observed annually as the execution day of Charles 
I, and November 5, 1788, the anniversary of William and Mary of Orange’s arrival in Britain, was marked 
with century sermons excoriating governmental abuse of power and praising the vindication of individual 
rights and liberties. Id. Moreover, a favorite tack of propagandists was to invoke the abuses committed by 
Charles I and James II while comparing those abuses with those of George III. Id. 
 125. James M. Farrell, The Writs of Assistance and Public Memory: John Adams and the Legacy of 
James Otis, 79 NEW ENG. Q. 533, 535–36 (2006). The Navigation Act passed by the British Parliament 
prohibited the colonists from engaging in trade with any country besides Great Britain; naturally, the 
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of many American colonists, these writs invaded upon their personal 
liberties to be secure in their homes, and Otis argued as much to the 
court.126 In Otis’s view, such a writ was “the worst instrument of 
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the 
fundamental principles of law.”127 He also took the opportunity to 
emphasize that Charles I’s exercise of such arbitrary power had 
resulted in Charles’s losing his head.128 The issuance of these writs 
infringed upon “one of the most essential branches of English liberty[,] 
the freedom of one’s house,” which Otis implied to be a liberty 
guaranteed by the British Constitution.129 Otis concluded his speech 
with the then-novel but now-familiar argument that an “act against the 
Constitution is void,” in other words, that the legislature lacks the 
power to pass acts in violation of the Constitution.130 Adams, a 
firsthand witness to Otis’s masterful oration, declared in later writings 
that “American independence was then and there born; the seeds of 
patriots and heroes was then and there sown. . . . Then and there was 
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of 
Great Britain.”131 In the words of both Otis and Adams, we can see the 
development of one of the colonists’ main complaints against 
Britain—the wielding of power in a plainly arbitrary manner. 
 In 1762, Otis published his first political pamphlet wherein he 
sought to assert for the legislative body the singular authority to levy 
taxes and approve expenditures of public funds.132 He explained that 
                                                                                                             
colonists sought to skirt this legislation, and many traders engaged in the smuggling of goods. ROBERT P. 
ST. JOHN & RAYMOND L. NOONAN, LANDMARKS OF LIBERTY: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
IDEALS AS RECORDED IN SPEECHES FROM OTIS TO HUGHES 4 (Robert P. St. John & Raymond L. Noonan 
eds., 2d ed. 1922). In an effort to combat smuggling, the British employed writs of assistance, which were 
issued by courts and allowed customs agents to search the homes of persons suspected of smuggling 
without first demonstrating probable cause to a magistrate. Farrell, supra. The controversy surrounding 
these writs was considered by the Supreme Court and informed its opinion in Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886). 
 126. ST. JOHN & NOONAN, supra note 125. 
 127. James Otis, Writs of Assistance, in LANDMARKS OF LIBERTY, supra note 125, at 6. 
 128. Id. at 7. 
 129. 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, app. A, at 524 (Boston, Little, Brown, 
& Co. 1865). Otis, supra note 127, at 8. 
 130. ADAMS, supra note 129, at 522. 
 131. ST. JOHN & NOONAN, supra note 125, at 5. 
 132. OTIS, supra note 33, at 31–33. In Otis’s view, the governor usurped this power when he authorized 
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the governor and his council, when the legislature was in recess, 
asserted that they had “a right to do what they judge ‘the supreme 
law,’. . . for ‘the safety of the people being the supreme law, should at 
all events . . . be provided for.’ This is a short method to put it in the 
power of the Governor and Council, to do as they please . . . .”133 In 
Otis’s view, the dogma espoused by the governor was merely a method 
by which to excuse the arbitrary use of his executive power—akin to 
the Lockean notion of executive prerogative—which, according to 
Otis, “in plain English means no more than to do as one pleases.”134 
Essentially, to exercise power arbitrarily is to exercise power without 
limitation.135 
Complaints and concerns about the arbitrary use of power found 
their way into other discussions, both contemporary to Otis and later. 
Often, the exercise of arbitrary power was referred to as a violation of 
the fundamental laws.136 An executive can violate fundamental laws in 
numerous ways, but the crux of the violation comes from the 
executive’s encroachment either upon powers reserved to another 
branch of government or upon personal liberties the people did not 
cede to the government: 
                                                                                                             
the expenditure of funds to pay the costs of providing protection to a fishery. Id at 33. In response, the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives issued a Remonstrance to the governor, accusing him of taking 
from the House “their most darling priviledge, the right of originating all Taxes.” Id. at 15. As Owens 
portentously surmised in his preface, “The world ever has been and will be pretty equally divided, between 
those two great parties, vulgarly called the winners, and the loosers; or to speak more precisely, between 
those who are discontented that they have no Power, and those who never think they can have enough.” 
Id. at iv. 
 133. Id. at 38–39. 
 134. Id. at 39. 
 135. John Phillip Reid, In Legitimate Strips: The Concept of “Arbitrary,” the Supremacy of Parliament, 
and the Coming of the American Revolution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 459, 461–62 (1977). Charges of tyranny 
often appeared in conjunction with accusations of arbitrariness. Id. Tyranny invokes an idea of unlimited 
power. Id. 
 136. Fundamental laws are 
laws relating to personal liberty, the privileges of the subject, and the powers of the 
magistrate—to private property and the execution of justice—to the punishment of 
evil-doers and the preservation of the public peace—to marriage, education, religion, 
and the rights of conscience—to the public forms, and order of government—and to 
the revenues and taxes, by which the state is supported. 
Elizur Goodrich, The Principles of Civil Union and Happiness Considered and Recommended (1787), in 
1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra note 104, at 913, 918. 
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[I]f people must propose conditions unto kings to be by them 
acquiesced in, and submitted unto, at their admission to the 
government, which thereupon becomes the fundamental 
laws of the government, and security for the peoples rights 
and liberties, giving a law claim to the people to pursue the 
king, in case of failing in the main and principle thing 
covenanted, as their own covenanted mandatarius, who hath 
no right or authority of his own, but what he hath from them, 
and no more power but what is contained in the conditions 
upon which he undertaketh the government.137 
In other words, the executive wields only so much power as the 
people relinquish to him, and, in exchange, he agrees to submit to the 
people’s conditions, which become the fundamental laws. For the 
colonists, encroachments on such fundamental laws included levying 
money, keeping a standing army in time of peace, quartering soldiers 
in violation of the law and without the legislature’s consent, and 
interfering with free elections.138 
As the Revolution drew nearer, colonial discussions of executive 
power shifted yet again, as indicated by the linguistic data, to center 
on considerations of the king’s executive power. The colonists’ 
complaints against King George III were numerous, but the thrust of 
their argument in favor of independence was a familiar one: the king’s 
abdication of his duty to protect the colonists’ rights and liberties in 
violation of their mutual contract,139 his abuse of the prerogatives 
                                                                                                             
 137. Defensive Arms Vindicated (1783), in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 
1730–1805, supra note 104, at 712, 736–37 (emphasis added). 
 138. William Henry Drayton, Judge Drayton’s Charge (Apr. 23, 1776), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF 
THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note 104, at 72, 76. Drayton notes that these encroachments were 
all committed by King James II prior to his being overthrown, and all amounted to violations of the 
fundamental laws. Id. As Drayton clarifies, “he did those things without consent of the legislative 
assembly chosen by the PERSONAL ELECTION of that people, over whom such doings were exercised.” Id. 
 139. William Henry Drayton, Another—By Judge Drayton (Oct. 15, 1776), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS 
OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note 104, at 79, 82 (“[T]he British king, by his hostilities, had as 
far as he personally could, absolved America from that faith, allegiance and subjection she owed him; 
because the law of our land expressly declares, these are due only in return for his protection, allegiance 
being founded on the benefit of protection.”). 
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bestowed upon him, and his exercise of arbitrary power.140 In 1776, 
these complaints were consolidated in the Declaration of 
Independence. Among the colonists’ grievances were the king’s 
refusal to “assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the 
public good,” dissolution of legislative bodies and refusal to call for 
the election of new representatives, taxation of the colonies without 
their consent, placement of restrictions on the colonists’ trade, 
maintenance of a standing army without the colonies’ consent, and 
encroachment on the judiciary.141 
Given the reaction to the perceived abuses of power by the monarch, 
it is not surprising that, when the time came to develop a new system 
of government, the conversation’s focus shifted from considerations 
of who wielded the executive power to how that power should be 
allocated.142 By the time this sense appeared in the public discourse, 
Founding Era Americans understood the executive power to 
encompass, at its most fundamental, the power to execute those laws. 
Certain prerogatives were traditionally held by the British executive 
(that is, the monarch), but unlike the power to execute the law, the 
executive prerogative could be both granted and constrained by the 
people—the people defined the bounds of the prerogative.143 
                                                                                                             
 140. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 141. Id. paras. 3, 7, 17. 
 142. This shift is illustrated in a letter penned by John Adams to Thomas Brand Hollis in 1787: 
All I can Say is that it appears plain to me that every great Nation must have three 
Branches or but one. And if it has but one, that one must be a Simple Monarchy or in 
other Words a Despotism. A Government of one assembly or of two assemblies only 
in any great nation, cannotexist but in a State of civil War that will soon end in 
Despotism, of one Man. I am not Solicitous about the Name of the first Magistrate, 
provided he have the whole Executive Power. call him Podesta, President, 
Consul, anything, as you will.—Anything Sir! I am not afraid of the Word. 
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Brand Hollis (Oct. 18, 1787), in The Adams Papers, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/?q=podesta&s=1111311111&sa=&r=1&sr= 
[https://perma.cc/BZC8-LN5F]. 
 143. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 205 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mary Carolyn Waldrep ed., 2014) 
(“As incident to the undefined power of making war an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles 
II had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. . . . At the 
revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights 
then framed that ‘the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with 
the consent of Parliament, was against law.’”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra, at 677 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations 
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Prerogative, then, was distinct, and thus divisible, from executive 
power.144 Importantly, prerogative should not be conflated with 
discretion; executive power was understood to afford the executive 
with discretion to execute the laws as he saw fit.145 
                                                                                                             
between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights 
not surrendered to the prince.”); LOCKE, supra note 67, at 204 (“[T]hey have a very wrong notion of 
government who say that the people have encroached upon the prerogative when they have got any part 
of it to be defined by positive laws . . . .”); MATHER, supra note 104, at 456 (“As there are certain rights 
of men, which are unalienable even by themselves; and others which they do not mean to alienate, when 
they enter into civil society. And as power is naturally restless, aspiring and insatiable; it therefore 
becomes necessary in all civil communities (either at their first formation or by degrees) that certain great 
first principles be settled and established, determining and bounding the power and prerogative of the 
ruler, ascertaining and securing the rights and liberties of the subjects, as the foundation stamina of the 
government . . . .”); Resolutions of the Committee Chosen by the Several Counties in Pennsylvania, in 
PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 104, at 175, 175 (“‘The prerogatives 
are limited,’ as a learned judge observes, ‘by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible to 
exceed them, without the consent of the people on the one hand, or without, on the other, a violation of 
that original contract, which, in all states impliedly, and in ours most expressly, subsists between the 
prince and subject.”); VILE, supra note 66, at 72 (noting that the legislature ultimately has control of the 
executive prerogative); James Wilson, Vindication of the Colonies (Jan. 1775), in 1 AMERICAN 
ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES BY THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF 
AMERICA 68, 72 (Frank Moore ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) (“The measures of [the king’s] 
power, and the limits beyond which he cannot extend it, are circumscribed and regulated by [the British 
constitution] . . . . Liberty is, by the [British] constitution, of equal stability, of equal antiquity, and of 
equal authority with prerogative. . . . The law is the common standard, by which the excesses of 
prerogative, as well as the excesses of liberty, are to be regulated and reformed. . . . [P]rerogative can 
operate only when the law is silent.”). 
 144. This idea finds support in Thomas Jefferson’s draft of a constitution for Virginia: 
The Executive—powers shall be exercised by a Governor . . . . By Executive powers 
we mean no reference to those powers exercised under our former government by the 
crown as of it’s prerogative; nor that these shall be the standard of what may or may 
not be deemed the rightful powers of the Governor. We give him those powers only 
which are necessary to carry into execution the laws, and which are not in their nature 
[either legislative or] Judiciary. 
Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 294, 299 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-
06-02-0255-0004 [https://perma.cc/DN5R-UFFD]. 
 145. Contemporary dictionaries likewise support this distinction. Discretion was defined first as 
“[p]rudence; knowledge to govern or direct one’s self; skill; wise management” and second as “[l]iberty 
of acting at pleasure; uncontrolled and unconditional power . . . .” Discretion, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. Johnson et al., 8th ed., rev. 1799). Prerogative was 
defined as “[a]n exclusive or peculiar privilege.” Prerogative, 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. Johnson et al., 8th ed., rev. 1799). 
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III.   The Original Public Meaning of Executive Power 
In seeking to discern an original meaning of executive power, it 
must not be discounted that the American colonists were, at their most 
basic, British. And as such, they maintained their right to enjoy the 
liberty and privileges enjoyed by those citizens residing in the mother 
country.146 The liberty enjoyed by the British people could be found 
“[i]n Laws made by the Consent of the People, and the due Execution 
of those Laws; [the British citizen is] free not from the Law, but by the 
Law.”147 Importantly, the king was not viewed as being above the law, 
and because the legislature created the law, the legislature was the 
supreme power.148 
Colonial dissatisfaction with the long line of British monarchs who 
misused the prerogatives, as well as the colonial perception of 
Parliament as an oppressive and tyrannical force, led to grave concern 
about the potential for abuse inherent in an unchecked allocation of 
governmental power.149 As such, the colonists preserved the 
                                                                                                             
 146. An anonymous pamphlet entitled The Freeholder’s Political Catechism explains that a British 
“Freeholder” is “govern’d by Laws, to which [he] give[s] [his] consent, and [his] Life, Liberty, and Goods, 
cannot be taken from [him], but according to those Laws[.]” THE FREEHOLDER’S POLITICAL CATECHISM 
3 (London, J. Roberts 1733). 
 147. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. at 5, 9 (“Q. Why is the Legislative Power Supreme? A. Because what gives Law to all, must be 
Supreme. . . . Q. Is not then the King above the Laws? A. By no means . . . . he can have no Power but 
what is given him by Law . . . .”). And as Lord Edward Coke, quoting Bracton, declared to King James I, 
“quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege.” Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 
1342 (K.B.) 1343; 12 Co. Rep. 64, 65. Lord Coke borrowed this phrase from the medieval legal scholar 
Bracton; however, Coke omitted Bracton’s final words of the phrase: “quia lex facit regem.” Translated, 
the phrase in its entirety reads, “The king ought to be under no man, but under God and the law, because 
the law makes a king.” Rex non debit esse sub hoine, sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem, HENRY 
CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND PHRASES OF 
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN 1043 (11th ed. 2004). Locke, likewise, 
identified the legislative power as the supreme power. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 187, 188. 
 149. See LOCKE, supra note 67, at 187, 188; Madison Debates: June 25, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_625.asp [https://perma.cc/QWZ5-FW8J] (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019) (“We must as has been observed suit our Governmt. to the people it is to direct.”); see 
also Madison Debates: June 1, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_601.asp [https://perma.cc/7PFZ-YAKA] (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019); supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text. Madison noted, 
Mr. [James] Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and 
responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch 
as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were 
of Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he 
 
34
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/9
2020] EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED 641 
fundamental definition of executive power that was imported from 
Britain, with British history and colonial experience contributing to the 
development of a distinctly American interpretation of the term.150 
Accordingly, although the Framers declined to define executive power 
in concrete terms,151 recurring in the colonial discussion of executive 
power was the idea that the executive’s role should be confined to a 
discrete function—namely, the power to execute the law.152 
The text of the Constitution itself reveals the Framers’ efforts to 
thwart the types of abuses committed by the British king and 
Parliament. The colonists’ complaints against Parliament largely 
related not to the scope of Parliamentary power but to how Parliament 
used its power to infringe upon the colonists’ rights and liberties. On 
the other hand, the grievances against the king were directly related to 
the scope of the power he possessed, particularly his prerogatives.153 
                                                                                                             
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, 
not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature. 
Madison Debates: June 1, supra. 
 150. Frisch, supra note 62, at 281–82 (discussing the “originality of the American regime” as a blend 
of traditional notions of monarchical power and republicanism); see also Madison Debates: June 25, 
supra note 149 (Charles Pinckney noted, “[I]t is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imitation 
of a Government calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose views ought to be extremely 
different. Much has been said of the Constitution of G. Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the 
best Constitution in existence; but at the same time I am confident it is one that will not or can not be 
introduced into this Country, for many centuries. -If it were proper to go here into a historical dissertation 
on the British Constitution, it might easily be shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature 
of that Governmt. can not possibly be introduced into our System-that its balance between the Crown & 
the people can not be made a part of our Constitution.”). 
 151. Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics, 37 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 66, 68 (2007). 
 152. See Frisch, supra note 62, at 281 (“It is clear that at the time of the Constitutional Convention 
virtually none of the delegates . . . were cognizant of a role for executive power in a republican 
government beyond that of law enforcement and administration.”). 
 153. Reinstein, supra note 108, at 271. Professor Reinstein divides these prerogatives into five 
categories: “(1) power over legislation and taxation; (2) power over the execution of laws; (3) control over 
the legislature; (4) foreign affairs, military, and war powers; and (5) power over commerce.” Id. The 
British monarch held a portion of the legislative power in that no bill could become law without the 
sanction of the monarch. Id. at 277. The Framers maintained the executive veto power but subjected that 
power to congressional override, greatly weakening the prerogative from that vested in the king. Id. at 
278; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 143, at 546–47 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The qualified 
negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign . . . .”). 
Another prerogative the Framers denied the President was the power to suspend or dispense with laws, 
accomplished through the constitutional requirement that the President “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.” Reinstein, supra note 108, at 280. The President was also deprived of the right to 
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The necessity of a weakened executive was bolstered by seventeenth-
century Parliamentary failures to control the abuses of Charles I and 
James II. As such, the prerogatives granted to the President were 
significantly constrained in comparison to those held by the king—in 
fact, the Constitution endowed the President exclusively with only one 
of the royal prerogatives.154 The remaining royal prerogatives were 
“vested completely in Congress, prohibited to the President, [] 
altogether omitted from the Constitution[, or] . . . more limited or 
structurally shared with the legislative branch.”155 The legislature, 
however, held powers markedly similar to those held by Parliament. 
The legislative power, in traditional discourse, was the power to make 
the law,156 and Congress retained that power. Perhaps most 
importantly, no power held by Parliament was vested in the American 
executive.157 Essentially, the Constitution is the culmination of the 
Framers’ efforts to prevent a recurrence of those defects they perceived 
in the British governmental form. Executive power should be 
understood as nothing more than the power to execute the law;158 any 
                                                                                                             
summon and dismiss the legislature, as well as the exclusive power of appointment of government 
officials. Id. at 285, 288. The royal prerogatives to declare war, make treaties, and dispatch ambassadors 
were divided between the President and the Senate by imposing the requirement of Senatorial approval. 
Id. at 303; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 143, at 548 (“The President is to be commander-
in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the 
same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing 
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and 
admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the 
raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would 
appertain to the legislature.”). 
 154. Reinstein, supra note 108, at 271. Namely, the power to receive foreign ambassadors and public 
ministers. Id. at 305. By contrast, “[e]ighteen royal prerogatives were removed entirely from the Executive 
and delegated to Congress.” Id. at 304. 
 155. Id. at 271. 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 143, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The essence of the 
legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of 
society . . . .”). 
 157. Reinstein, supra note 108, at 304. In an effort to prevent legislative tyranny, the Framers divided 
the branch into two distinct bodies and provided for a check by the way of “interference” by the executive 
and judicial branches. VILE, supra note 66, at 174–75. The executive holds veto power over the legislature 
(although, to reiterate, the presidential veto is much weaker than the royal veto), and the judiciary holds 
the power to invalidate laws. Id. 
 158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 143, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he execution of the 
laws, and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense, 
seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate.”) (emphasis added). 
 
36
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/9
2020] EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED 643 
other power vested in the executive is synonymous with prerogative, 
and the President’s ability to exercise that prerogative must remain 
within the bounds set by the Constitution.159 
The corpus linguistic data likewise support this inference. The 
prevailing senses alone give credence to the argument that the 
colonists’ understanding of executive power was inherently 
intertwined with and defined by its British origins. As further evidence 
of this proposition, among the most frequently used senses in Founding 
Era texts were senses (4) and (5), pertaining to the executive power of 
the Crown and to an executive body or council, such as the British 
Parliament, respectively.160 It is therefore telling that the colonists 
resorted to the same phrases used in the same ways as their British 
predecessors when discussing the formation of a centralized 
government of states. Moreover, semantically, the reference to a 
singular executive power, as opposed to the divisible power of the 
legislature used in Article I, harkens back to the notion of the executive 
power vested in the Crown. Again, the drafters’ syntax and use of 
language points to the executive’s deep roots in British political 
underpinnings, suggesting that the Framers were deeply invested in not 
only preserving but also perfecting the British governmental structure 
that they knew. 
Finally, although we have spent considerable time on the isolated 
phrase executive power, that phrase must be considered in context. 
Indeed, the Framers understood that the Constitution would be 
interpreted according to the “usual and established” rules of statutory 
interpretation, which as discussed briefly in Part I, include the noscitur 
a sociis rule—that is, that Article II must be construed in the context 
of the surrounding text.161 Thus, the meaning of “executive power” 
                                                                                                             
 159. See generally id. 
 160. See app. 2. 
 161. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish 
a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791) in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-0060-0003 [https://perma.cc/UN6H-
GZK4] (“[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, that 
intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the usual & established rules of 
construction.”) (emphasis added); BRUTUS, ESSAY NO. 11 (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
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must be considered in light of the Constitution’s preamble,162 which 
makes clear that the Constitution was ratified in furtherance of six 
expansive purposes: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, 
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote 
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity.”163 Although these purposes are most often reduced 
to rhetoric, they should be consulted when attempting to define the 
terms of the Constitution. 
A syntactic analysis of the first purpose, “to form a more perfect 
Union,” indicates that the Framers sought to draft a constitution 
providing for a government superior to another. Although, at first 
glance, this appears to be a reference to the failed union created 
pursuant to the Articles of Confederation, historical context shows that 
at several points in its history, Britain was referred to as a “perfect 
Union.”164 Marrying the plain grammatical reading with the historical 
context, the phrase then takes on new meaning: to create a form of 
government superior to that of Britain. Indeed, the Revolution was 
                                                                                                             
FEDERALIST 417, 421 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s31.html [https://perma.cc/JW2Q-B4PX] (“[I]n construing 
any of the articles conveying power, the spirit, intent and design of the clause, should be attended to, as 
well as the words in their common acceptation.”). 
 162. BRUTUS, ESSAY NO. 12 (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 161, 
at 422, 424, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s20.html 
[https://perma.cc/XPR6-F6AD] (“[The courts] will be authorized to give the constitution a construction 
according to its spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter. To discover the spirt of the 
constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has in view. These 
are expressed in the preamble . . . .”). 
 163. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 164. Id. This phrase was used during the reigns of multiple monarchs, including James I, James II, and 
Anne. COBBETT, supra note 119, at 356, app. 1 at cxxix. Queen Anne used the phrase herself during a 
speech to Parliament: “An entire and perfect Union [of England and Scotland] will be the solid foundation 
of lasting peace: it will secure your religion, liberty and property, remove the animosities among 
yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our own two kingdoms . . . .” Id. app. 1 at cxxix, 
356; see also id. at 356 (“The kindness and indulgence your majesty [Queen Anne] hath expressed for all 
your subjects: your care to create a perfect union among us by forewarning us of the mischiefs of 
divisions . . . .”); 8 T. SMOLLETT, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 224 (London, James Rivington & 
James Fletcher 1758) (“[King James II] replied, That he did not expect such a remonstrance from the 
commons, after he had demonstrated the advantages that would arise from a perfect union between him 
and his parliament . . . .”); James I, Speech to Parliament Concerning Union with Scotland (1607), in 
CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TUDOR-STUART ENGLAND 164, 164 (Paul L. Hughes & Robert F. Fries eds., 
1959) (“I desire a perfect union of laws and persons, and such a naturalizing as may make one body of 
both kingdoms under me [James I] your King . . . .”). 
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understood “as the final, violent phase of a sustained effort to vindicate 
the true meaning of the ancient English constitution.”165 In Federalist 
No. 5, John Jay quotes Queen Anne, explaining that Britain’s history 
“gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience 
without paying the price it cost them.”166 And the Framers sought to 
do just that—learn from the failures of the British form of government 
and establish a reformed government that would secure the life, liberty, 
and property of the new American citizens. 
IV.   Executive Power: The Supreme Court vs. The Court of Public 
Opinion 
Despite the compelling historical backdrop and relatively fixed 
understanding, if not explicit definition, of executive power in 
Founding Era American discourse, the courts of both law and of public 
opinion have interpreted Article II in ways that justify a wide variety 
of presidential (mis)conduct—much of which is only dubiously 
consistent with early understandings of the phrase.167 In fact, empirical 
data collected in the late 1980s shows that the Supreme Court voted to 
uphold presidential action 66.3% of the time during the postwar era 
spanning from 1949 to 1984, and federal appellate courts upheld 
challenged presidential action in 73.4% of instances.168 Thus, in 
contrast to the Founding Era public understanding of the executive’s 
limited role as a check on legislative power, the last half-century has 
been characterized by a judicial tendency to ratify a broad variety of 
                                                                                                             
 165. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 888 
(1985). 
 166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, supra note 143, at 18 (John Jay). 
 167. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1364–65 (2013) 
(noting that the executive has claimed and will continue to claim “extraordinary authority . . . reading the 
supposed ambiguities of Article II as an invitation to act”). 
 168. Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal Judges and Presidential Power: Truman to Reagan, 
22 AKRON L. REV. 561, 565 (1989). Interestingly, the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University 
School of Law reports that, during the Trump presidency, federal courts have upheld challenged executive 
action in only four of the fifty-nine cases surveyed. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, 
N.Y.U. INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup 
[https://perma.cc/ZB3H-YG9P] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019). 
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presidential actions.169 To that end, the following presents a brief 
survey of two flagship Supreme Court cases—one upholding the 
exercise of executive power and one restricting it—and a discussion of 
the public response to those judgments. 
A.   Expanding Executive Power Beyond Mere Execution: Myers v. 
United States 
In 1920, President Woodrow Wilson removed Portland postmaster 
Frank Myers from office, igniting litigation that eventually made its 
way to our country’s highest court.170 Following his dismissal, Myers 
filed suit in the United States Court of Claims, contending that Wilson 
had no authority to remove Myers or any other postmaster from office 
without the consent of the Senate.171 Chief Justice William Taft, 
writing for the majority, addressed the question of “whether under the 
Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing 
executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”172 
In an opinion spanning more than seventy pages, the Chief Justice 
relied heavily on the debates surrounding what he referred to as “the 
decision of 1789” to support his conclusion that the President, in fact, 
possesses an exclusive power of removal.173 Focusing on statements 
                                                                                                             
 169. N.Y.U. INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, supra note 168. It is also worth noting that judges of both political 
affiliations overwhelmingly supported presidential action in cases concerning the President’s apparent 
infringement on the legislative power. Ducat & Dudley, supra note 168, at 567 (noting 83.3% of 
Democratic judges and 88% of Republican judges voted to uphold the presidential action at issue). 
 170. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. The statute at issue read as follows: “Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be 
appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.” Id. at 107. 
 173. This decision concerned the establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the ensuing 
debates centered on the question of whether the Secretary of the Department should be removable by the 
President. Id. at 111. Taft seems to base his reliance on these debates largely upon the fact that eighteen 
legislators—eight Representatives and ten Senators—were present at the Constitutional Convention. Id. 
at 114, 285. Taft noted that six of the eight Representatives and six of the ten Senators voted to imbue the 
President with the removal power. Myers, 272 U.S. at 114–15. Taft glossed over the fact that the bill 
passed the House by a vote of 29-22 and only passed the Senate after Vice President John Adams cast the 
deciding vote, breaking a 10-10 tie. Id. 
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made by James Madison, Taft established three theories upon which 
his holding rested: 
(1) “[A]rticle [II] by vesting the executive power in the 
President was intended to grant to him the power of 
appointment and removal of executive officers except as 
thereafter expressly provided in that [A]rticle”;174 
(2) “[T]he express recognition of the power of appointment 
in the second section [of Article II] enforced this view on 
the well-approved principle of constitutional and 
statutory construction that the power of removal of 
executive officers was incident to the power of 
appointment”;175 and 
(3) It would be unreasonable to assume that the Framers, 
without express provision, intended to give any part of 
the legislative branch the ability to direct the executive 
and, in doing so, potentially hamper the executive’s 
discharging his duties by saddling him with inefficient or 
disloyal subordinates or subordinates who maintained 
different political views than his own.176 
Taft noted that, consistent with the Founding Era understanding of the 
phrase, the “vesting of the executive power in the President was 
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws.”177 But he chose 
not to stop there, opining “that the natural meaning of the term 
‘executive power’ granted the President included the appointment and 
removal of executive subordinates.”178 In support of this assertion, he 
looked no further than his Court’s earlier decisions, explaining that his 
broader view of executive power comported with the phrase’s “natural 
meaning” because appointments and removals “certainly were not the 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. at 115. 
 175. Id. at 119. 
 176. Id. at 131. 
 177. Id. at 117. 
 178. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117. 
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exercise of legislative or judicial power in government as usually 
understood.”179 Ultimately, Taft’s opinion stands for the proposition 
that any attempts by Congress to limit the presidential power to remove 
executive officers appointed by the President are unconstitutional. Taft 
returned to the President one of the prerogatives the Framers chose to 
deny him: the power of removal.180 
Three justices—McReynolds, Brandeis, and Holmes—dissented 
from the majority opinion. Justice McReynolds approached the issue 
in a manner remarkably similar to that of Taft, going so far as to use 
many of the same sources as Taft, albeit to reach a different 
conclusion. McReynolds conceded that removal could be an executive 
act, if Congress so decreed, but posited that Congress retained the 
power to direct how that removal could be accomplished.181 Justice 
Brandeis took a different tack, choosing to address a significantly 
narrower question than that addressed by Taft.182 He focused on the 
separation of powers and emphasized that the Convention of 1787 
adopted the doctrine “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the 
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but 
by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the 
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people 
from autocracy.”183 Justice Holmes’s dissent was significantly briefer 
than those of his fellow dissenters, succinctly emphasizing his belief 
that “[t]he duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a 
                                                                                                             
 179. Id. at 117–18. 
 180. See Reinstein, supra note 108, at 294. Professor Reinstein finds significant the exclusion of an 
expressly enumerated removal power considering how important the removal power was to the British 
monarch. Id. He views the removal power as an implied power subject to congressional restriction. Id. at 
322 n.347. Such an interpretation comports with the idea that the legislative power includes the power to 
direct the executive as to how it should execute the law. 
 181. Myers, 272 U.S. at 231 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“If it be admitted that the Constitution by 
direct grant vests the President with all executive power, it does not follow that he can proceed in defiance 
of congressional action. Congress, by clear language, is empowered to make all laws necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution powers vested in him.”). 
 182. Id. at 241 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“May the President, having acted under the statute in so far as 
it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision 
which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take place? It is this narrow question, and this 
only, which we are required to decide.”). 
 183. Id. 
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duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more 
than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”184 
The public immediately recognized and, in most cases, condemned 
the Court’s expansion of the executive power.185 The overarching 
public opinion seemed to be that the Myers decision effectively 
transformed the President of our democratic nation into a despot or at 
least provided him with the authority to behave as a despot. Senator 
Hiram W. Johnson of California remarked that “[t]here will be those 
who exclaim what this country needs is another Mussolini and who 
rejoice in any extension of executive power, and others who declare 
that the very liberty of the people is involved in the stability of official 
tenure.”186 The headlines in a Nebraska newspaper declared “Can 
Remove as He Wills,” “New Power to President Granted by Supreme 
Court,” and “Congress Shorn of Rights,” indicating that the public 
recognized the gravity of the decision.187 Still other articles expressed 
increasingly alarmist views: “[U]nder the supreme court’s latest 
interpretation, the chief executive can lop off heads right out in public 
without asking anybody’s permission.”188 In an effort to emphasize the 
significance of the Myers decision, one article listed all those 
government officials the President could now dismiss with 
capriciousness, specifically the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Comptroller General, and the 
Postmaster General, among others.189 Nevertheless, some support was 
                                                                                                             
 184. Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 185. The magnitude of this decision was even recognized by our neighbors to the north. See, e.g., The 
President’s Powers, WINNIPEG TRIB., Nov. 11, 1926, at 4 (“Something akin to dismay swept through old-
fashioned ‘liberty loving’ Americans last week when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that it was within 
the power of the President to remove postmasters and other statutory officials without waiting for the 
Senate’s concurrence.”). 
 186. Ruth Finney, Johnson Says President’s Removal Power is Menace, PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 6, 
1926, at 13. 
 187. Can Remove as He Wills, NEB. ST. J., Oct. 26, 1926, at 1; see also Presidential Firing Power, 
OXNARD PRESS-COURIER, Nov. 13, 1926, at 2 (“The decision does give a President dangerous power over 
federal commissions and boards created by Congress and, in theory, at least, working 
independently. . . . There are numerous bodies of this type whose usefulness is greatly lessened if their 
members hold their jobs only by grace of the President who appointed them. They will tend to lose their 
individuality and independence and merely reflect the views of the Executive.”). 
 188. Senate Will Fight for Power to Fire, IRONWOOD DAILY GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1926, at 6. 
 189. Eliot Harris, Supreme Court Makes President an Autocrat, LINCOLN HERALD, Nov. 12, 1926, at 
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expressed for the Myers opinion, most of which downplayed the 
alarmism exhibited by the opinion’s critics while celebrating the 
elevation of the executive.190 
Corpus linguistic tools once again provide useful evidence in 
support of these public sentiments. A search in the Corpus of 
Historical American English (COHA) yielding the collocates of 
executive power during the 1910s and 1920s shows that the following 
words were among those that most frequently co-occurred with the 
phrase executive power: limit, uncontrollable, stretch, and violent.191 
Additionally, a COHA collocate search for words appearing one word 
to the left of executive during this time period produced interesting 
results—whereas the same search in the COFEA performed in Part I 
of this paper yielded no collocates with private sector connotations,192 
the COHA search shows that in the early 1900s, private sector 
associations were beginning to creep into the list of executive’s 
collocates.193 For example, industrial occurred fifth most frequently 
                                                                                                             
1. The article went on to explain the extent of the President’s newly expanded power of removal: 
By his control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the president is made absolute 
master of the railroads, so far as these come under the government control at all. By his 
control of the Federal Reserve Board, he becomes dictator of our national banking 
system. He is czar of the administration of justice in Alaska and the District of 
Columbia by virtue of his power to dismiss the judges of these regions . . . No 
constitutional monarch in the world has anything remotely approaching such power. If 
the king of England tried to exercise any one of these powers without the consent of 
parliament, he would be ousted from his palace and his throne as soon as the English 
people could realize what he was doing. 
Id. 
 190. A West Virginia newspaper’s editorial board compiled views of the Myers opinion collected from 
newspapers across the country. The Columbus Ohio State Journal expressed contempt for critics of the 
Myers opinion, writing, “The view of the liberals . . . probably is that the decision places a dangerous 
power in the president’s hands, capable of being abused greatly. The danger exists theoretically but is 
almost negligible practically. A president, sobered by his great office, is not likely to be a mere political 
self-seeker.” Emphatic Disagreement over Ruling on President’s Powers, BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Nov. 4, 1926, at 6. The Richmond News-Leader wrote that “for better or for worse, America is committed 
to executive, not to congressional administration, and American must make real the power of the man to 
whom she entrusts her affairs.” Id. 
 191. Corpus of Historical American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, https://www.english-
corpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4P-XNYY] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) [hereinafter COHA] 
(collocate search of executive power in 1910 and 1920 looking at results within four words to the left of 
the phrase). 
 192. See discussion supra Part I. 
 193. COHA, supra note 191 (collocate search of executive in 1910 and 1920 limited to words occurring 
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after chief, central, national, and democratic.194 While the public 
understanding of the executive’s role remained solidly rooted in a 
governmental context and, in fact, appears to have closely aligned with 
the original Founding Era understanding of executive power, evidence 
of the preliminary stages of linguistic drift toward the private-sector 
connotation of executive is also apparent and possibly influenced the 
evolution of public perception of the executive’s role. 
B.   Agreeing to Disagree: A Fragmented Supreme Court’s 
Rejection of Executive Overreach in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. 
Sawyer 
Although President Harry Truman became the thirty-third President 
merely by default upon the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, he 
took comfortably to the position and frequently tested the bounds of 
executive power during his tenure.195 After ordering American troops 
into Korea in 1950 without specific Congressional authorization, an 
act by itself of questionable constitutionality,196 Truman pressed the 
limits of his executive authority even further by issuing Executive 
Order 10340.197 In an attempt to thwart a potential nationwide 
steelworker strike, Truman’s executive order directed the Secretary of 
Commerce to seize privately owned steel mills.198 Again acting 
without Congressional approval, the President justified his bold move 
as necessary to address the imminent national defense crisis that would 
result should steel production halt during wartime.199 The steel 
companies complied under protest but challenged the constitutionality 
of the President’s actions almost immediately, arguing that the “order 
amount[ed] to lawmaking, a legislative function which the 
                                                                                                             
within one word to the left of executive). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 
32 (1995). 
 196. See generally id. 
 197. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 97, Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (No. 745). 
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Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the 
President.”200 
Although a six-to-three majority declared Truman’s actions 
unconstitutional, the Court remained highly fragmented as to the 
reasons why, resulting in the issuance of seven distinct opinions.201 
Justice Hugo Black, a renowned constitutional originalist,202 spoke for 
the majority in a brief opinion defined by a faithful adherence to the 
doctrine of separation of powers.203 In language reminiscent of the 
Founding Era, he noted, “In the framework of our Constitution, the 
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes 
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”204 Thus, he rejected the 
government’s argument that Article II vests in the President “all the 
executive powers of which the Government is capable.”205 Instead, he 
held that the seizure of the steel mills was an unconstitutional 
infringement by the President on the legislative powers of Congress.206 
Accordingly, Justice Black’s oft-overlooked majority opinion was 
                                                                                                             
 200. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 582–83. 
 201. Id. at 580; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 353 (5th ed. 
2015). 
 202. HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8 (1968) (“I strongly believe that this history shows 
that the basic purpose and plan of the Constitution is that the federal government should have no powers 
except those that are expressly or impliedly granted, and that no department of government—executive, 
legislative, or judicial—has authority to add to or take from the powers granted it or the powers denied it 
by the Constitution . . . judges may [not] rewrite our basic charter of government under the guise of 
interpreting it.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black 
and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 24, 31 (1994) (noting that Justice Black believed that “there is a single, 
immutable, judicially discoverable meaning for each part of the Constitution” and asserted that “in the 
construction of the language of the Constitution . . . we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the 
condition of the men who framed that instrument”) (quoting BLACK, supra). 
 203. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 582–89. 
 204. Id. at 587. 
 205. Id. at 640 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 199, at 96). Bizarrely, the government, at one 
point in its brief, appeared to justify the expansive use of presidential power in the steel seizure case with 
the fact that Truman ordered troops into Korea, claiming that act was a lawful “exercise of the President’s 
constitutional powers.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 199, at 98. However, history has shown that 
Truman’s unilateral commitment of troops to the Korean conflict without congressional consent was far 
from constitutionally black and white. See generally Fisher, supra note 195. 
 206. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587 (“This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military 
authorities. . . . The Constitution limits [the President’s] functions in the lawmaking process to the 
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.”). 
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arguably extremely faithful to the original public meaning of executive 
power. 
Despite the fact that Justice Black wrote for the majority, courts and 
scholars have favored Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Steel Seizure, which, while reaching the same conclusion, took a 
markedly different approach to interpreting executive power. Justice 
Jackson posited that “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.”207 He proceeded to lay out his seminal three-part 
framework of “practical situations in which a President may doubt, or 
others may challenge, his powers,” which he defined as: (1) when the 
President acts with Congressional authorization, whether it be express 
or implied; (2) when the President acts without Congressional 
authorization, but relying on his own independent powers; and 
(3) when the President acts contrary to the express or implied will of 
Congress.208 Jackson argued that the magnitude of presidential power 
is determined by which of the three categories defines his actions, with 
the first category affording the most power to the President and the 
third, the least.209 Without addressing the consistency of this 
framework with the original public meaning of executive power,210 
unquestionably Jackson’s canonized framework has been relied upon 
by courts and scholars alike to justify a sweeping variety of executive 
actions, many of which were and remain unfathomable under a 
Founding Era understanding of executive power.211 
                                                                                                             
 207. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 208. Id. at 635–38. 
 209. Id. at 636–37. 
 210. While we seriously question whether a President acting pursuant to Jackson’s third category would 
ever be within the bounds of the original meaning of executive power, answering this question is simply 
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, our discussion of Steel Seizure is offered for the purpose of 
illustrating the lasting effects of judicial interpretation on public perception of executive power and the 
ways in which judicial decisions are used to affirmatively shape the power of the President. 
 211. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that the President 
has the exclusive power to formally recognize a foreign sovereign, even though doing so falls within 
Jackson’s third category and the action is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress”); 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (holding in part that Congress has the right to delegate to 
the President the authority to prescribe aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty by a court-
martial upon a member of the Armed Forces who has been convicted of murder); Dames & Moore v. 
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In addition to the legal nuts and bolts, the facts of Steel Seizure were 
highly publicized in American newspapers and elicited a strong 
reaction from the 1950s public.212 Truman was likened to a king, 
attempting to usurp the executive power through his assertion of a 
“divine right.”213 He was referred to as “the wrong sort of president” 
attempting to “drag us into dictatorship.”214 A Chicago women’s group 
characterized the seizure of the steel manufacturing plants as the 
“latest of a long line of executive usurpation of power through 
executive orders and in derogation and usurpation of the constitutional 
powers vested in the Congress of the United States—all of which acts 
are illegal . . . and rest on claims to unlimited and unrestrained 
executive power” and called for a new presidential candidate.215 A 
New York paper forcefully asserted that “[the district court’s] decision 
[finding Truman’s actions unconstitutional] sets off a nationwide steel 
strike, but it is far better that the nation bear the catastrophe of such a 
strike than that a precedent be suffered in departure from constitutional 
government.”216 Although some were willing to look past the 
                                                                                                             
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (relying on Jackson’s framework to justify the President’s authority to freeze 
Iranian assets in the United States). 
 212. See, e.g., Pat Hillings, Hillings Explains Stand on Steel Plant Seizure, COVINA ARGUS-CITIZEN, 
May 2, 1952, at 8 (“I have never seen the people at home as interested in government and politics as they 
are today. Everywhere I went throughout the district, Democrats and Republicans alike expressed deep 
concern and disgust over the corruption and lack of morality in the government. The people at home seem 
to be aware of the fact that only a change in our national leadership can eliminate corruption and restore 
confidence in the executive branch.”); Text of O’Connor’s Speech to Senate on Steel Seizure, BALT. SUN, 
Apr. 23, 1952, at 7 (“The seizure of the steel plants is the very kind of situation that t[h]e founding fathers 
foresaw as leading to the concentration of too much power in one branch of the government.”); Think 
Straight, Legalists, MARION STAR, Apr. 19, 1952, at 6 (calling precedent permitting the President’s 
seizure of the steel mills “shortsighted”). 
 213. James W. Fifield, Jr., Steel Seizure Akin to the Theory of Divine Right of Kings, Says Minister, 
DAILY TIMES (Davenport, Iowa), Apr. 28, 1952, at 14 (“I am terrified at the thought of an America so 
apathetic, so unconcerned, so demoralized that it will sit passively by as the dagger of unlimited executive 
power is pressed toward the very heart of American freedom.”). 
 214. Show-Down Time, ITHACA J., Apr. 26, 1952, at 6. 
 215. Steel Seizure Is Scored by Club Women, CHI. STAR, June 3, 1952, at 5. 
 216. Historic Decision Outlawing Steel Seizure Moves for Return to Government Under Law, PRESS & 
SUN-BULL. (Binghamton, N.Y.), Apr. 30, 1952, at 6 (referring to the government’s argument that the 
President is vested with “inherent powers” as a “shadowy theory” and positing that a “[p]resent definition 
of the limitations of executive power is wholesome and salutary in a period . . . in which the executive 
branch would tend to stretch its prerogatives and tend to deem too lightly the philosophy of checks and 
balances implicit in the Constitution”). 
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constitutional implications and focus on the politics at play—
presidential defense of downtrodden steel workers against the greedy 
interests of “big steel” robber barons217—the public appears to have 
overwhelmingly disapproved of President Truman’s actions as 
executive overreach. 
Again, as was the case in Myers, the rhetoric surrounding Steel 
Seizure is thematically similar to that present in the Constitutional 
Convention debates and in the wider public discourse of the Founding 
Era: a rejection of a monarch;218 a preference for limited executive 
functions as opposed to broad, inherent executive power;219 and a 
deferential view of the legislature as the exclusive maker of laws.220 
Moreover, a corpus-based search of the phrase executive power shows 
that, during the 1940s and 1950s, executive power most frequently 
co-occurred with jealousy, limits, broad, and fear, among others.221 
Searching COHA for adjectives within three words preceding 
presidency during the same time period likewise produces unfit, 
powerful, Jacksonian, and big.222 This data suggests that, in the public 
discourse of 1940s and 1950s America, the President was criticized for 
his attempted expansion of executive power and that the American 
people wanted to retain the more narrow meaning of the Founding Era, 
consistent with Justice Black’s majority opinion. However, just as in 
                                                                                                             
 217. Holmes Alexander, Maybe Truman Planned the Steel Seizure as Campaign Ammunition, L.A. 
TIMES, May 9, 1952, at 39 (explaining that, before issuing Executive Order 10340, Truman ordered a 
nation-wide sampling of public opinion regarding seizure of the steel mills, the results of which showed 
“no sympathy for the steel owners,” “no misgivings about the power of seizure,” “little if any feeling that 
the snatching of somebody else’s property was a violation of the Constitution,” and “no tremor to indicate 
fear of dictatorship”). 
 218. Madison Debates: June 1, supra note 149. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. COHA, supra note 191 (collocate search of “executive power” in 1940 and 1950). The third most 
common collocate associated with executive power during this time period was McCarthy, demonstrating 
how fickly associated the notion of executive power is with political movements. Id. Further review of 
the concordance line results shows that even where broad is associated with executive power, it is in the 
context of Congress’s authorizing a temporary broad grant of executive power to the President or judicial 
disapproval of an attempt to assert broad executive power. Id. Therefore, the corpus linguistic data 
supports the conclusion that broad executive power was viewed with disfavor during this time period. 
 222. Id. (collocate search of presidency during the 1940s and 1950s limited to adjectives occurring 
within three words to the left). 
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the 1910s and 1920s, a collocate search of the term executive in the 
1940s and 1950s shows an increased frequency of private sector 
collocates—even more than in the Myers era—suggesting that 
executive continued to take on new connotations throughout the 
twentieth century.223 
C.   Executive Action in the Modern Era: Half a Century of 
Presidential Overreach 
While the political discretion of the judiciary has undoubtedly 
shaped the legal definition of executive power, the corpus linguistic 
data and the social response to those judicial opinions suggest that the 
public meaning of executive power has nevertheless remained 
relatively fixed. The common thread in public discourse from the 
Founding Era to the 1920s through the 1950s is a rejection of perceived 
presidential overreach, evincing a public understanding of a narrow 
executive power limited to little more than the mere execution of the 
laws. Indeed, a series of presidential attempts to usurp more power 
than is allocated to the position led one commentator to refer to the 
presidency as a “juggernaut that crippled the proper functioning of [] 
government.”224 
The above reference was particularly aimed at the actions taken by 
disgraced President Richard Nixon in connection with the infamous 
Watergate scandal. Among the allegations levied against Nixon at his 
impeachment hearings were that he “used the executive power to 
authorize illegal surveillance and investigations by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation,” “used the executive power to unlawfully establish a 
special investigative unit inside the White House to engage in unlawful 
covert activities,” “used the executive power to obtain confidential tax 
return information from the Internal Revenue Service,” and “used the 
executive power to impede lawful inquiries into the conduct of his 
                                                                                                             
 223. Id. (collocate search of words occurring within one word to the left of executive during the 1940s 
and 1950s). 
 224. Herbert H. Bennett & Theodore Koskoff, Foreword to ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 
CONFERENCE, THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY: FINAL REPORT 5 (1975) [hereinafter POWERS OF THE 
PRESIDENCY]. 
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office.”225 In other words, the draft impeachment articles read as a 
laundry list of actions effected by the President’s exercise of executive 
power not at all related to the President’s executive function—that is, 
the execution of the laws. 
Even apart from the abuses of executive power stemming from the 
Watergate scandal, Nixon was criticized for attempting to expand the 
scope of the executive in various other aspects of his presidency.226 
For instance, in 1971, prior to Watergate, the Chicago Tribune referred 
to Nixon as an “arrogant usurper of ‘raw executive power’ not 
delegated to him under the Constitution.”227 Democratic Senator Sam 
Ervin, ultimately an instrumental figure in the Watergate scandal, 
reportedly contended that Nixon had amassed “the most dangerous 
concentration of executive power in our history.”228 Much criticism 
centered around Nixon’s liberal use of the executive order, an 
ever-more familiar theme in twenty-first century American political 
discourse. Moreover, Watergate, the ensuing investigations, and 
Nixon’s ultimate resignation clearly exacerbated public distrust of a 
powerful executive. The office of the President was referred to as “the 
imperial presidency,”229 a “runaway presidency,”230 and an “iniquitous 
presidency.”231 One newspaper comically asserted that Nixon’s 
presidency made “the Cult of the Strong Presidency about as popular 
as snake handling in church” and that former “true believers” in the 
strong executive movement were losing faith as a result of his 
actions.232 Thus, history suggests that, even when a strong executive 
                                                                                                             
 225. Draft Impeachment Articles, reprinted in Compromise Impeachment Articles to be Debated, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 25, 1974, at 4. 
 226. See, e.g., Executive Abuses, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 25, 1971, at 14 (“The Nixon administration 
has disturbed the triangle of power in a number of alarming ways.”). 
 227. Willard Edwards, Nixon Rapped on ‘Raw Power’ Play, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 1971, at 12. 
 228. Gaylord Shaw, Nixon Using Executive Power in Efforts to Reshape Government, LAWTON 
CONST., Mar. 15, 1973, at 18 (referring to the President’s policies, not the allegations of Watergate). 
 229. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Rise in Gall of the American Emperor, BALT. SUN, Dec. 23, 1973, 
at 35; see also POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 224. 
 230. Arnold B. Sawislak, Congress Has Only Self to Blame for Runaway Presidency Powers, 
SIMPSON’S LEADER-TIMES (Kittanning, Pa.), Jan. 24, 1974, at 6; see also POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, 
supra note 224. 
 231. Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Weakness of the Presidency, DAILY WORLD (Opelousas, La.), 
Feb. 28, 1975, at 4; see also POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 224. 
 232. Sawislak, supra note 230. 
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movement gains temporary momentum, as it did during President John 
F. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign, an overly strong executive in practice is 
inconsistent with the American view of the President’s constitutionally 
vested executive power, a view that has remained relatively fixed since 
the Founding Era. 
CONCLUSION 
“[T]he experience of man sheds a good deal of light . . . not merely 
on the need for effective power, if society is to be at once cohesive and 
civilized, but also on the need for limitations on the power of governors 
over the governed.”233 It is no surprise then that concerns about 
executive power have plagued public discourse well into the 
twenty-first century with no apparent end in sight. Presidents Obama 
and Trump are not the only Presidents to be accused of pressing the 
boundaries, and even exceeding the scope, of the executive power. 
Indeed, every President since Nixon has been assailed with accusations 
of executive overreach.234 No doubt, the controversy over the 
                                                                                                             
 233. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
 234. Bruce Bartlett, The Ebb and Flow of Executive Power, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Feb. 18, 2014, 
12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/the-ebb-and-flow-of-executive-power 
[https://perma.cc/7CVZ-ATZV] (“The modern history of congressional concern about executive 
overreach begins with Richard Nixon.”); Richard M. Salsman, When It Comes to Abuse of Presidential 
Power, Obama is a Mere Piker, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardsalsman/2013/01/28/when-it-comes-to-abuse-of-presidential-
power-obama-is-a-mere-piker/#12d3e236235e [https://perma.cc/U2BQ-6JQV]. See, e.g., Breach of 
Faith, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Nov. 18, 1978, at 2 (characterizing the Carter administration’s closure of 
millions of acres in Alaska to commercial development as “the most arbitrary and capricious use of 
executive power [] ever encountered”); James Cary, Pardon Raises Question of Power, FREMONT TRIB., 
Oct. 3, 1974, at 4 (discussing the public “furor” raised by Ford’s issuance of a “full, free, and absolute 
pardon” to Nixon); Alexander Cockburn, Impeachment: Always a Good Idea, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, 
at 29 (“Clinton’s arrogance rivals that of Richard Nixon’s during the Watergate crisis.”); Michael Kinsley, 
President Should Let Congress Make War, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 22, 1993, at 12 (discussing expansion 
of executive power under President George H.W. Bush); Anthony Lewis, A Drastic Assertion of Executive 
Power, SHEBOYGAN PRESS, Mar. 31, 1983, at 40 (calling on the Supreme Court to reject ”[a broad] 
assertion of executive power” under Reagan); Thomas B. Edsall, Trump’s Tool Kit Does Not Include the 
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/opinion/trump-
democracy-midterm-elections.html [https://perma.cc/JCU4-HAJ7] (“Trump won the Republican 
nomination and the presidency by conducting a campaign directly challenging the notion that the 
electorate will punish a politician for ‘violating accepted constitutional arrangements.’ He has not wavered 
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Executive’s proper role will continue to plague scholars and politicians 
well into the future. However, if the Constitution is akin to a contract 
between the American people and their government, then the original 
meaning of “executive power” is instrumental in understanding its 
terms. And though the desires of the Founding Fathers are 
unknowable, like any contract, the literal words on the page and the 
context in which they were written are strong evidence of exactly what 
the American people bargained for in 1787. Moreover, with the help 
of corpus linguistics and modern technology, we now have the tools to 
study more empirically the original meaning of a constitutional phrase 
as understood at its inception. 
Finally, we do not expect that an original public meaning analysis 
of executive power will close the debate surrounding the proper 
exercise of executive authority in the United States. Nevertheless, it 
should be considered as an interpretive ground zero—informing the 
debate from the perspective of those who entered into this “more 
perfect union” over two hundred years ago. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
from this course throughout the first year of his presidency, and, barring unforeseen events, it will guide 
him into the 2020 election. If Republicans retain control of both branches of Congress in 2018 . . . Trump 
will claim vindication. His assault on the pillars of democracy will continue unabated, with increasingly 
insidious effect.”); Dahlia Lithwick, Tyranny in the Name of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/12/opinion/tyranny-in-the-name-of-freedom.html 
[https://perma.cc/W96L-PBG7] (characterizing “the use of the Secret Service to silence [protestors at the 
Republican National Convention] as an abuse of the executive power”); Michael D. Shear, Obama’s Effort 
to Go It Alone on Guns Brings Republicans Together, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/01/05/obamas-effort-to-go-it-alone-on-guns-brings-
republicans-together [https://perma.cc/J5HK-PM6J] (noting the opinions of prominent Republicans as to 
President Obama’s decision to “take unilateral action on gun control in the face of congressional 
gridlock”). 
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APPENDIX 1: RAW SENSE FREQUENCY CODING 
1. As belonging to a Single Governmental Leader (non-royal) 
(e.g., President, governor) 
2. As belonging to the head of a private company  
3. As referring to one’s autonomy over oneself (akin to will 
power)  
4. As belonging to a body of Governmental leaders (e.g., 
council) 
5. As belonging to the Crown/Divine power 
6. As a division of finite governmental power relating to the 
allocation of responsibilities between governmental branches 
Year Register Sense Freq. 
1754 Franklin Papers 4 1 
1754 Franklin Papers 1 1 
1755 Franklin Papers 1 1 
1760 Franklin Papers 4 2 
1760 Franklin Papers 1 1 
1761 Election Sermon 5 1 
1761 Election Sermon 4 1 
1762 Political/Legal 4 11 
1764 Political/Legal 1 1 
1764 book 4 1 
1766 Political/Legal 5 1 
1766 Election Sermon 1 2 
1767 Religious Sermon 3 1 
1767 Election Sermon 5 1 
1767 Religious Sermon 1 1 
1768 Election Sermon 1 3 
1768 Personal Letter 1 1 
1768 political speech by non-political 1 1 
1769 Political/Legal 1 4 
1769 Personal Letter from Gov. 1 1 
1769 Political/Legal 4 1 
1769 religious text 5 1 
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1770 Adams Papers 5 1 
1770 Franklin Papers 5 3 
1772 Religious Sermon 3 1 
1772 Newspaper 5 1 
1772 Adams Papers 5 1 
1773 John Locke 5 9 
1773 John Locke 3 7 
1773 John Locke 1 11 
1773 Political/Legal 5 1 
1773 religious text 5 1 
1774 Election Sermon 4 1 
1774 pamphlet 5 1 
1774 pamphlet 1 1 
1774 Jefferson Papers 1 1 
1774 religious text 5 1 
1774 political/legal 5 1 
1775 Adams Papers 1 1 
1775 Hamilton Papers 5 2 
1775 Edmund Burke (speech) 4 1 
1775 Political/Legal 5 1 
1775 Election Sermon 4 1 
1775 Franklin Papers 5 1 
1775 Newspaper 1 1 
1775 Newspaper 5 1 
1775 Religious Sermon 1 1 
1776 Adams Papers 1 10 
1776 Adams Papers 4 1 
1776 Newspaper 5 1 
1776 Jefferson Papers 1 2 
1776 pamphlet 5 2 
1776 Jefferson Papers 1 1 
1776 political/legal 5 1 
1776 political/legal 4 1 
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1777 political/legal 1 5 
1778 Religious Sermon 5 1 
1778 political/legal 1 8 
1779 political/legal 3 1 
1779 political/legal 1 9 
1780 Religious Sermon 1 1 
1780 Election Sermon 4 1 
1780 Adams Papers 4 2 
1780 Political/Legal 1 1 
1780 Jefferson Papers 1 1 
1781 Political/Legal 1 12 
1781 religious text 5 1 
1782 Election Sermon 5 1 
1782 political/legal 4 1 
1782 political/legal 1 2 
1782 book 1 1 
1783 political/legal 1 2 
1784 political/legal 1 2 
1784 political/legal 5 1 
1785 personal letter 6 1 
1785 pamphlet 6 1 
1785 book 3 1 
1785 political/legal 1 1 
1786 Political/Legal 1 1 
1787 pamphlet 4 1 
1787 court case 6 2 
1787 Hamilton papers 1 3 
1787 political/legal 6 2 
1787 Adams Papers 6 1 
1787 Adams Papers 1 1 
1787 book 3 1 
1788 pamphlet 1 2 
1788 pamphlet 5 1 
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1788 pamphlet 6 1 
1788 Adams diary 1 1 
1788 Hamilton Papers 1 2 
1788 Monroe Papers 6 1 
1788 Monroe Papers 1 3 
1788 Monroe Papers 5 1 
1788 Adams Papers (Letter) 5 1 
1788 geographic report 4 6 
1788 geographic report 1 2 
1788 Political/Legal 6 1 
1789 Adams Papers 5 2 
1789 Adams Papers 6 9 
1789 Jefferson Papers 5 3 
1789 Hamilton Papers 1 1 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: SENSE FREQUENCY PER MILLION   
FREQUENCY PER MILLION 
Period Total Words 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1754–
1759 
211,416.49 4.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1760–
1764 
2,753,412.14 0.73 0.00 0.00 5.45 0.36 0.00 
1765–
1769 
4,972,328.99 2.61 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.60 0.00 
1770–
1774 
5,381,648.53 2.42 0.00 1.49 0.19 3.72 0.00 
1775–
1779 
12,974,673.67 2.93 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.77 0.00 
1780–
1784 
13,969,904.80 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.21 0.00 
1785–
1789 
11,711,510.81 1.45 0.00 0.17 0.60 0.68 1.62 
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